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This thesis seeks to explain variation in the outcomes of cocalero mobilization in Peru 
and Bolivia.  When cocaine became a popular drug in the United States in the late 1970s 
to early 1980s, governments of the coca-producing countries in the Eastern Andes began 
implementing policies that included forcible eradication of coca plants, often with U.S. 
assistance. Cocaleros in Bolivia not only protested against government policy, but also 
formed a national movement using political alliances that included indigenous and labor 
unions.  In contrast, Peru’s cocaleros also mobilized against forced eradication, but a 
coherent national movement never materialized.  This is a problem because social 
movement literature indicates Peru and Bolivia share many factors that should contribute 
to increasing levels of mobilization: decentralization measures, a consistent threat from 
national and international entities, neoliberal reform and backlash, and a recent turn to the 
political left.  This thesis argues that cocalero movements first require political 
associational space before they can expand their movement through political alliances 
and achieve an upward shift in the scale of their movement. Furthermore, it finds that 
when cocalero movements use credible and resonant frames of protest, they are more 
likely to mobilize broader support and realize their goals.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis research will seek to explain variation in the outcomes of coca grower 
mobilization in Peru and Bolivia.  In Bolivia, mobilization grew from the local to the 
national level, involving linkages with other sectors; in Peru, organization has remained 
largely regional and limited to coca growers.  The activism of coca growers, or cocaleros, 
has shaped Andean politics at the local, regional, national, and even international levels 
in recent years.  The conflicts birthed from the escalating issue surrounding the use of the 
coca plant can certainly be categorized under what social movement scholars call 
“contentious politics.”1 
This thesis centers on the coca-cocaine issue, which is largely a product of the 
twentieth century. However, its salience has spiked over the last three decades as 
cocaleros emerged as a social movement in the Andes.  In Peru and Bolivia, unions of 
coca growers formed to push their national governments to represent the farmers whose 
most profitable crop remained the coca plant, despite government efforts to provide 
alternative development.2  The coca unions both borrowed and learned from other social 
movements as the unions protested the state eradication measures enacted against them 
and their coca fields.  For example, early indigenous movements in Bolivia, as well as the 
coca unions, focused on organizing as peasants to obtain social services and benefit from 
government land reform policy.3   
Traditionally, the indigenous peoples in the high selva region of the Eastern 
Andes are the ones who have grown and consumed the dried coca leaf.  Added to this 
traditional consumption, prior to the twentieth century, Peru and Bolivia grew thriving 
                                                 
1 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, “Dynamics of Contention,” Social Movement 
Studies 2, no. 1 (April 2003): 99–102, doi:10.1080/14742837.2003.10035370. 
2 Alternative development is widely considered the best alternative to forced eradication of coca fields, 
as it provides farmers with suitable crops to replace the coca plant. The economic viability of such plans is 
widely contested, however. For a deeper discussion, see Coletta A Youngers and Eileen Rosin, Drugs and 
Democracy in Latin America: the Impact of U.S. Policy (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2005).  
3 Deborah Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and 
the Postliberal Challenge (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 156. 
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legal industries exporting coca and cocaine to the United States and Germany.  In the 
mid-twentieth century, an international crusade against cocaine began, which saw the 
intersection of the coca growers with the larger illicit drug industry as a prime target for 
anti-drug policy.4  Since the late 1970s, government eradication policy targeting the coca 
plant as the supply side of the cocaine production chain has presented deep challenges to 
indigenous coca growers.  In response, a new social movement emerged in both countries 
in opposition to their national governments.   
Distinctions between Peru and Bolivia’s indigenous people and cocaleros are 
difficult because the cocaleros are a subset of indigenous in both countries.  Additionally, 
outsiders often view the Bolivian cocalero movement, prima facie, as an indigenous 
movement.  Cocaleros have often had to shift the over-arching identity of their 
organizations to increase participation.  As a result, the lines have become increasingly 
blurred between coca farmers, peasants, and ethnic indigenous people.  A variety of 
factors influenced the governments of Peru and Bolivia to either accommodate or repress 
cocaleros involved in protest.  Such factors include pressure from the international 
community to meet certification requirements, views on whether the drug problem is a 
supply- or demand-side issue, the economic benefit of the drug trade to their country, and 
the mobilization of interest groups, especially the cocaleros.5 This thesis specifically 
focuses on the factors that affect cocalero mobilization. 
Of the coca-producing countries in the Andes, only Peru and Bolivia have seen 
significant popular organization to protect the right to grow the coca plant, though their 
goals vary across time and across country.6 In Colombia, where Indians either had 
disappeared or had been assimilated into mestizo societies by the 1940s, there was little 
                                                 
4 Paul Gootenberg, Andean Cocaine: The Making of a Global Drug (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2008), 9–12. 
5 Raul Rocha, “The Political Economy of Counterdrug Policy in the Case of Bolivia, 1997–2006,” 
master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School. 
6 For example, some cocaleros movements have made it their goal to legalize the indigenous 
consumption of the coca leaf while others have gone as far as attempting to legitimize the export of the leaf 
for worldwide consumption.  
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resistance to evolving prohibitionist efforts.7  Since the turn of the twenty-first century, 
cocaleros in Peru and Bolivia have gained political importance in their respective 
countries, though the extent to which they were able to scale up the level of their 
movement through political alliances varied.  Only Bolivia’s indigenous groups have 
lobbied for decriminalization of the coca plant and successfully worked through national 
and international institutions.  On the other hand, Peru’s groups have had limited success 
in achieving temporary recognition of traditional coca cultivation rights from regional 
governments, and not the national government. This study analyzes variation across 
country and across time to determine why Peru’s cocalero movement remained regional 
while Bolivia’s movement synthesized into a strong national lobby with extensive 
political power.   
B. IMPORTANCE 
This research will inform our understanding of the politics surrounding cocalero 
movements in Peru and Bolivia, countries that are top-three suppliers of coca feeding the 
world cocaine market.  Explaining cross-national variation across the two countries in the 
strength and scope of the movements will help us better understand the domestic politics 
of both countries, broadly speaking, including political instability and the state-led 
violence that cocalero movements have triggered.  On the other hand, state actions also 
have influenced the trajectory of the cocalero movements.  The rights of cocaleros to 
plant, grow, market, and sell coca have been consistently challenged in Peru and Bolivia 
over the past few decades, leading to violent protests and allegations of human rights 
abuses in both countries.  Avoiding such conflicts should be the goal of any well-
informed policy. Finally, because the debate over the legalization and decriminalization 
of coca has spilled onto the international scene within the last decade, the past, current, 
and potential influence of coca groups in Bolivia and Peru has relevance beyond the 
borders of both countries, specifically, in terms of their ability and willingness to 
cooperate multilaterally on drug trafficking and drug supply reduction.  
                                                 
7 Francisco Thoumi, Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes (Baltimore, MD: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2003), 34. 
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C. PROBLEMS AND FINDINGS  
This thesis seeks to explain the causal mechanisms of cocalero mobilization and 
why such efforts to scale up the level of their movement either succeeded or failed.  
Every social movement must go through a dynamic process to create collective action, 
whether it is at a local, regional, national, or international level.  When a social 
movement has mobilized enough support to have influence at a new level, it is called as 
scale shift.  Social movement scholars Sidney Tarrow and Doug McAdam originally 
defined the term in their work Dynamics of Contention, as “a change in the number and 
level of coordinated contentious actions leading to broader contention involving a wide 
range of actors and bridging their claims and identities.”8  Because not every grievance of 
a social movement can be rendered meaningful, individual events that will have the 
greatest impact and mobilizing support must be selected and articulated.  David Snow 
and Robert Benford label this concept framing, defining it as “an interpretive schema that 
simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding 
objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action.”9  While social 
movements should be expected to use frames to mobilize further support, an opposing 
movement (or the state) can also be expected to use frames to marginalize their 
opposition. 
There has been much work dedicated to understanding the mobilization of 
indigenous groups in the Andes, but to a lesser extent the cocaleros, who do not fall 
neatly into a single category like indigenous or peasant.  Rather, the cocaleros focus on 
mobilizing around an issue that some governments outside the Andes, including for 
instance, the U.S. government, have traditionally viewed as a drug control problem.  Peru 
and Bolivia share a common history of cultivation of the coca plant, indigenous 
mobilization, neoliberal reform and associated backlash, government policies promoting 
coca eradication and alternative development, and a recent turn to the political left.  Yet 
the outcomes of Peru and Bolivia’s cocalero movements vary.  Specifically, Bolivia’s 
                                                 
8 Sidney Tarrow and Doug McAdam, “Scale Shift in Transnational Contention,” in Transnational 
Protest and Global Activism (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2005), 121–150. 
9 Hank Johnston and John A Noakes, Frames of Protest (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 
Inc, 2005). 
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cocaleros used frames surrounding their indigenous culture to advance their movement 
and were able to scale shift from local to regional, national, and international levels.  
Peru’s cocalero movement scale shift never truly happened, but not for lack of trying.   
As a first task, this thesis seeks to explain frames and tactics used by cocaleros to 
broaden their support base and achieve a scale shift.  Since cocaleros in Peru and Bolivia 
used some of the same frames and tactics but with different outcomes, this thesis also 
shows that there are pragmatic and radical approaches to framing; selecting the right one 
may be the difference between success and failure.  Bolivia’s cocaleros used indigenous 
and peasant frames to secure their position as the leading national social movement.  
While some of the frames seem radical from an outsider’s perspective, their approach 
was truly pragmatic, reciprocating with other social movements and winning broad-based 
support.  To form a political party that saw success at the national level, Bolivia’s 
cocaleros had to use less radical frames and make some compromises to win the support 
of the urban and mestizo classes.  In contrast, Peru’s cocaleros experienced repression 
under the heavy hand of the national government, which framed cocaleros as drug 
traffickers.  The government’s counter-framing overpowered that of the cocaleros 
because in part, the cocaleros found economic protection from government eradication 
forces by allowing the radical Sendero Luminoso insurgency to live in the coca 
cultivation zones.  As the government maintained its policies that limited political 
associational space, a radical or pragmatic approach to framing became irrelevant.  When 
opportunity space opened in the 2000s, Peru’s cocaleros struggled to form a national 
movement because they initially adopted a radical stance that alienated outsiders.  The 
pragmatic approach was eventually used, but internal divisions within the movement kept 
it regional.   
As a second task, this thesis examines international, national, and subnational 
factors that may contribute to a cocalero movement’s scale shift.  In Bolivia and Peru, 
international pressure to reduce or eliminate the supply of coca was constant.  In both 
cases, cocaleros used an anti-U.S. discourse as a key frame to mobilize support.  In nearly 
every instance, this frame mobilized cocaleros from disparate regions and attracted 
outside support.  At the national level, the government used counter-frames with varied 
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success between the two countries.  In the case of Peru, the frames worked because 
people could easily associate cocaleros with drug traffickers and terrorists.  In Bolivia, 
the connection was more difficult to link.  When a country used forced eradication 
measures, the act provided an impetus for cocaleros to mobilize in protest, but there is not 
a direct causal link between the measures and a scale shift for cocaleros.  Indeed, in 
Bolivia the largest forced eradication operation was almost completely successful by the 
government’s standards, but cocaleros there did not achieve a scale shift until other 
opportunities were made available.  Lastly, this thesis finds that subnational factors like 
decentralization only contribute to a scale shift if other social movements are already 
allied behind cocaleros.   
As a third and final task, this thesis examines the eventual turn to the political left 
in Peru and Bolivia at the national level.  When Evo Morales was elected in 2005, his 
victory symbolized the end of the traditional party system in Bolivia and a complete 
disenchantment with free market reforms enacted in the 1980s.  Conversely, when 
Ollanta Humala became President of Peru in 2011, his election symbolized a turn to the 
political left, but the majority of Peruvians thought favorably of the results that the same 
market reforms brought them.  Cocaleros in Peru, however, were among those hardest hit 
by such reforms and attempted to channel what they thought should be a national 
grievance.  Therefore, a turn to the political left is not a causal factor for enabling a scale 
shift.  
The next section is a description of the recent trajectory of cocalero movements in 
both countries.  The description will cover some of the main events involving cocaleros, 
from the start of government-led eradication efforts to the formation of cocalero unions.  
This discussion will set the basis for a further analysis of cocalero mobilization. 
D. THE RECENT TRAJECTORY OF COCALEROS: FORCED 
ERADICATION LEADS TO MOVEMENT FORMATION 
1. Bolivia: An Active Cocalero Base on the Rise  
Bolivia’s cocalero movement has its roots in both indigenous and peasant-based 
organizations.  When the government enacted a 1988 law mandating the elimination of 
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all coca cultivation besides that dedicated for traditional use, the cocaleros mobilized.  
This law meant that the thousands of farmers that had migrated to the tropical Chapare 
region to grow coca were left with the dilemma of clashing with the state or attempting to 
grow unsustainable alternative crops.10 The most aggressive anti-coca government 
initiative in Bolivia began almost a decade later in 1997.  President Hugo Banzer’s 
(1997–2001) Plan Dignidad represented the greatest challenge to coca growers in the 
history of Bolivia, as it sought to reduce illegal coca production to zero within five 
years.11  As the struggle between coca growers and the national government intensified, 
even the legal and traditional coca growing Yungas region was targeted for eradication.  
Since the end of the Banzer presidency in 2001, Bolivian politics have taken a gradual 
turn to the political left.  Evo Morales has led Bolivia’s indigenous coca grower unions to 
increased political salience.  The coca growers were able to form political alliances across 
geographic boundaries and across disparate social groups in order to form a strong 
national movement and eventually a political party.  In the most recent display of 
cocalero political strength, Bolivia’s coca growers won a concession from the United 
Nations as a vote to remove coca from the 1961 UN Drug Convention’s schedule of illicit 
substances passed with overwhelming support in January 2013.12 
2. Peru: Struggles to Form a National Cocalero Movement 
In Peru, coca growers found themselves caught between the state and the Sendero 
Luminoso Maoist insurgency from the early 1980s, and shifted their alliances from one 
side to the other depending on which group represented a greater threat.  First, the 
government began its eradication effort in 1981 called the Special Project to Reduce 
Coca Cultivation in the Alto Huallaga (CORAH), accompanied by a government program 
                                                 
10 Kenneth Lehman, “A ‘Medicine of Death’? U.S. Policy and Political Disarray in Bolivia, 1985–
2006,” in Addicted to Failure, ed. Brian Loveman (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2006), 
133. 
11 Kathryn Ledebur, “Bolivia: Clear Consequences,” in Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The 
Impact of U.S. Policy, eds. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers Inc, 
2005), 154. 
12 Transnational Institute, “Bolivia Wins a Rightful Victory on the Coca Leaf,” news release, January 
11, 2013, United Nations Drug Control Info, http://www.undrugcontrol.info/en/newsroom/press-
releases/item/4267-bolivia-wins-a-rightful-victory-on-the-coca-leaf, accessed March, 2013.  
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for alternative development, Special Project for Alto Huallaga (PEAH) in 1982.  The 
initial incursions of the eradication forces in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV)—Peru’s 
center of coca cultivation—met violent resistance from coca growers.  Soon, the Maoist 
Sendero Luminoso guerillas found a save haven in the UHV and integrated themselves 
by protecting coca farmers from government eradication forces.  While the strategy 
worked to keep CORAH from accomplishing their mission, the cocaleros soon 
experienced life under Sendero, which placed severe restrictions on personal freedoms.  
The cocaleros then aligned themselves with the Peruvian Army to defend against the 
insurgents.13  The government therefore was able to successfully ally with coca growers 
to weaken Sendero, though it meant compromising on their eradication goals.14   
Coca growers in Peru organized and responded rapidly to government eradication 
measures in the late 1990s, as a period of relative non-confrontation between the state 
and coca growers came to an end.  President Fujimori wished to regain the lost perception 
of his cooperation on drug control programs and incidentally reignited the anger of the 
cocaleros.15  Later, now under President Alejandro Toledo (2001–2006), despite 
cocaleros showing their ability to gain concessions from the national government through 
their march on Lima in 2003, the following year demonstrated that Peru’s coca growers 
were fractionalized and in conflict with each other.  One thousand cocaleros responded to 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) eradication efforts in Carabaya province with a 
strike and seizure of the hydroelectric station at San Gabán.16  Further protests by 
cocaleros shut down roads and commerce in the San Martín department.  Under these 
conditions, regional politicians began to realize they could secure support for the regional 
governments through accommodation.  For coca growers, the response of regional 
politicians has been to unilaterally legalize cultivation of the coca plant.  In 2005, the 
                                                 
13 Enrique Obando, “U.S. Policy Toward Peru: At Odds for Twenty Years,” in Addicted to Failure, ed. 
Brian Loveman, trans. Lynn Eddy-Zambrano (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2006), 171–
174. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Isaias Rojas, “Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy,” in Drugs and 
Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy, eds. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin 
(Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc, 2005), 211–213. 
16 Obando, “U.S. Policy toward Peru: At Odds for Twenty Years,” 191. 
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departments of Cuzco, Huánuco, and Puno all declared coca cultivation legal within their 
respective jurisdictions.17  An eventual turn to the political left under Ollanta Humala 
(2011 to present) has done little for Peru’s cocaleros.  A series of empty promises has left 
the cocaleros in a state of limbo, though recent analyses show increases in coca 
cultivation under his administration.18   
In summary, Peru’s government has made some concessions to coca growers, but 
overall it has maintained a more amicable approach in dealing with international pressure 
to eradicate coca.19 While Bolivia’s coca growers rose in importance, Peru’s coca 
growers most recently failed to become an integral part of Ollanta Humala’s leftist 
government (2011–present), even though they were a key demographic for his election in 
2011 and his near-election in 2006.20  Peru’s coca growers have been able to force 
regional governments to acquiesce to their demands, but have not created linkages that 
should allow them to become a national influence.21 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The argument presented here, which rests on insights about framing and scale 
shifts in the literature on social movements, moves beyond other research on cocalero 
movements, which cannot account for the variation between Peru and Bolivia.  Much of 
the literature focuses on international factors, and primarily seeks to explain the role of 
foreign pressure, especially from the United States.  Others look at national level factors, 
like economic and political changes.  Still others use subnational factors like 
decentralization to explain the rise of cocaleros.  
First, there are international factors.  Resistance to international pressure to 
regulate coca is a long-standing tradition in Peru and Bolivia.  Paul Gootenberg writes 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 191–194. 
18 United Nations, World Drug Report 2013 (New York, NY: United Nations Publications, 2013). 
19 Pablo G. Dreyfus, “When All the Evils Come Together: Cocaine, Corruption, and Shining Path in 
Peru’s Upper Huallaga Valley, 1980 to 1995,” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 15, no. 4 (1999). 
20 Maxwell Cameron, “Peru: The Left Turn that Wasn’t,” in The Resurgence of the Latin American 
Left, eds. Steven Levitsky and Kenneth Roberts (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2011), 375–398. 
21 Rojas, “Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy,” 185. 
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that looking back as far as the League of Nations, Peru “consistently ignored League 
cocaine initiatives,” and Bolivia “rose in spirited defense of indigenous coca.”22  More 
recently, the United Nations Drug Convention of 1961 targeted coca, including coca leaf 
chewing, for extermination.  Since then, enormous pressure to take action against the 
coca fields and their cultivators has come from the governments of the countries that 
consume cocaine, especially in the United States.  At nearly every opportunity, the U.S. 
government has prioritized coca eradication over strengthening democracy and 
institutions, while ignoring violations of human rights.23  This is normally a result of the 
U.S. position that the cocaine problem can be handled on the supply side through 
eradication of the coca plant in the production countries.  The hypothesis of international 
pressure suggests that cocaleros organize and gain strength in response to what is seen as 
international intervention in domestic affairs.   
Importantly, the national governments of Peru and Bolivia have not initially been 
the ones decrying such intervention.  Rather, the cocaleros have consistently denounced 
the “imperialist Yanquis” from the north, causing some presidential candidates to use the 
same rhetoric in order to win their support.  Scholar Enrique Obando identified Peru’s 
presidential candidate Ollanta Humala as a nationalist-populist who nearly followed the 
lead of Evo Morales in 2006 as he campaigned in the Ayacucho and Cusco regions 
principally to win support among the coca growers. Though Humala promised a definite 
“end to foreign military (read: U.S.) involvement in the drug war,”24 he acknowledged 
that the country would still likely receive foreign financial assistance.25  Even part of 
Yashar’s hypothesis is that pressure from the U.S. government bolstered the Bolivian 
cocalero movement in the Chapare where the debate over the destination of its coca crop 
was particularly fierce.26 International pressure leads to the hypothesis that cocaleros 
                                                 
22 Gootenberg, Andean Cocaine: The Making of a Global Drug, 211. 
23 Rojas, “Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy,” 187. 
24 Obando, “U.S. Policy Toward Peru: At Odds for Twenty Years,” 189. 
25 Ibid. Indeed, under Humala, United States aid was $84 million in 2012, of which $29 million went 
to combat drug trafficking. See http://www.defensenews.com/article/20121007/DEFREG02/310070005/U-
S-Peru-Boost-Military-Ties-Fight-Terrorism-Drugs. 
26 Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the 
Postliberal Challenge, 186. 
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have significant leverage over national domestic politics as long as that pressure exists.  
At least on its face, this hypothesis seems not to explain variation between Peru and 
Bolivia; though international pressure has continued to be a challenge for both countries, 
cocaleros in Bolivia have exerted significant influence on their national government 
while Peru’s cocaleros have little to no voice in their national government on this issue. 
Second, domestic national factors—both economic and political—might play an 
important role in explaining the degree to which coca growers mobilize.  Neoliberalism is 
the main economic factor scholars identify for creating social turmoil and in the case of 
Peru and Bolivia, a backlash.  When Alberto Fujimori courted private investment in the 
mid-1990s, it resulted in unintended consequences, including mass layoffs from 
previously subsidized national sectors and a collapse in agricultural prices.  These 
systemic shocks caused by national policy contributed to the numbers of coca growers in 
Peru, providing a more robust pool for organization and mobilization.  A similar 
experience happened in Bolivia with the tin miners; following the collapse of the tin 
sector in the mid-1980s, many workers migrated to the Chapare region where they began 
to grow coca.  Additionally, the competition created by the opening of markets to 
international competition drove many would-be fruit and vegetable farmers in Bolivia to 
cultivate coca as their cash crop. Given that in both countries radical neoliberal reform 
took place that encouraged coca growing and, presumably, coca eradication, this factor 
alone cannot explain why Bolivia’s cocalero movement has been national, whereas the 
Peruvian movement has been regional. 
Other scholars discount neoliberalism as a causal factor for cocalero organization, 
relying heavily on the hypothesis that threats of government eradication are the main 
reason why coca growers take action to further their political interests.  Enrique Obando 
does not identify the neoliberal experience of Peru as an important factor for the 
emergence of cocaleros as a political group, but he does warn that continued attempts at 
eradication could lead Peru’s growers to join internationally with Bolivian coca unions 
among other nefarious consequences.  Obando’s analysis on Peru agrees with other 
scholars the importance of a continued threat of eradication: Government pressure to 
eradicate coca is likely to lead to alliances that permit cocaleros to scale up the level of 
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their movement to national or international salience.  That Bolivia was able to achieve 
this since Evo Morales’s presidency under favorable political conditions for coca growers 
while Peru’s cocaleros were unable under generally threatening circumstances presents a 
significant problem in the literature. 
Moving beyond national counterdrug policy, some scholars suggest that more 
complex political conditions in Peru and Bolivia could explain the regional versus 
national form of cocalero movements, using social movement theory.  Deborah Yashar’s 
Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the 
Postliberal Challenge describes how indigenous groups were able to mobilize under 
changing citizenship regimes.27 While Bolivia and Peru are similar cases, Peru is an 
anomaly, in that indigenous mobilization has been limited and regional.  Yashar 
concludes that if the same political conditions that explain the first wave of organization 
in Bolivia and other Andean countries existed in Peru, we could predict significant 
organization there as well.28 
In Bolivia, existing transcommunity networks, an opening in political association 
space beginning with the 1982 democratic transition, and a clear incentive to mobilize 
with the dismantling of state programs to support the rural sector in the 1980s, were the 
main drivers of movements. The literature suggests that the cocaleros, a “second-
generation movement,” were able to learn from the past indigenous movements, and at 
crucial moments secure political alliances to advance their interests on a national level.29  
In contrast, Yashar identifies Peru’s lack of both “political associational space” 
(i.e., space to organize politically) and “transcommunity networks” that connect different 
indigenous communities as the cause of a very weak, regional first-generation movement.  
The socially fragmenting conflict between the state and the Sendero Luminoso 
insurgency of the 1980s–1990s was the main factor inhibiting Peru’s indigenous 
                                                 
27 Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: the Rise of Indigenous Movements and the 
Postliberal Challenge. 
28 Ibid., 278. 
29 Nancy Grey Postero, Now We are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 43–44. 
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movements from organizing in any serious way on either a regional or national level.30  
One critic of Yashar’s work identified a problem central to this thesis: “Why have the 
Peruvian indigenous peoples not rebuilt these networks or created new ones since the end 
of the civil war?  Is it because even after the close of the war, Fujimori did not allow 
sufficient political associational space?”31 I utilize research on social movement 
mobilization and Peruvian politics in general to support my argument that civil conflict 
inhibited Peru’s coca growers from building political consensus any more than in a 
regional context through the 1990s.  My research builds on Yashar’s work to show that 
while political associational space is a crucial for cocaleros to scale shift, the way a 
movement is framed and the internal dynamics also affect the ability to forge broad based 
alliances.  Furthermore, this thesis shows that in the Peruvian case, the transcommunity 
networks destroyed by Sendero were not reconstructed under the Toledo regime.  Though 
Toledo implemented significant decentralization measures, cocaleros had to compete 
with other social movements for positions in the municipal governments and therefore 
could not take advantage of them in the same way as the Bolivian cocaleros.32 
The recent turn to the left presents an interesting hypothesis for why coca growers 
should be able to increase their mobilizational and organizational capacity.  Conventional 
wisdom suggests that right wing or authoritarian governments are more likely to align 
themselves with international governments and champion prohibitionist and eradication 
policies. By the same token, leftist government should be expected to promote social 
drug control strategies, including an end to eradication policies and the promotion of 
alternative development.  We see in Bolivia that this was the case, as Morales reversed 
government eradication policies and promoted social control to prevent drug traffickers 
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from obtaining coca for processing into cocaine.33  In explaining the rise of the current 
leftist regime in Bolivia, Raúl Madrid identifies the appeal of Morales’ Movimiento al 
Socialismo (MAS) party to a broad base of alienated voters.  The MAS originated from 
the cocaleros in the Chapare, but championed multiple causes in addition to agrarian 
reform, such as opposing trade liberalization and other neoliberal policies, and the 
nationalization of natural resources.34 The twenty-first century is therefore a critical 
juncture for Bolivia’s cocaleros as the MAS sought political alliances with other social 
movements in Bolivia, especially the mestizo dominated groups.35  
Peru’s experience with a political left turn is more ambiguous than the Bolivia 
case.  Some recent publications point to the presidential elections of 2006 when Ollanta 
Humala lost the race to Alan García as the near turning point in Peruvian politics.  
Though the coca-producing regions overwhelmingly voted for Humala, García’s political 
calculus paid off: “a party that kept urban voters content could win without the support of 
the highlands and the Amazon.”36 That cocaleros in Peru failed to form political alliances 
with urban mestizos is not in question, but explaining why they did not or could not is a 
partial goal of this thesis.  I will use literature on social movements in Peru as well as 
Peru’s experience with neopopulism to support the argument that cocaleros remained a 
mere regional movement because of a stigma in the country against the left for past or 
perceived association with revolutionary violence and that Peru’s experience under 
neoliberalism differed greatly from Bolivia leading to fewer opportunities for political 
alliances. 
Third, there are subnational factors that may be of particular importance to the 
cocalero movements in Peru and Bolivia.  Along with neoliberal reforms in the 1990s, the 
governments of Peru and Bolivia made attempts to decentralize control over their rural 
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areas as a result of international pressures.37 Postero writes that because of the neoliberal 
exclusion of Indians, “Bolivians are moving past neoliberal forms of multiculturalism—
and indeed ‘indigenous politics’—to a new era of citizenship practices and contestation 
focused on redefining the state and popular access to it.”38 In her view, cocaleros have 
been successful at promoting both peasant agriculturalist agendas as well as identifying 
themselves within the terms of international indigenous rights discourse.  Since the ethnic 
and peasant-based Katarista movement of the 1970s, cocaleros have spotlighted 
themselves as representatives of Bolivia’s indigenous people.  Postero similarly forecasts 
the ability of other cases to experience strong indigenous movements when states 
experiment with conditions of multiculturalism and neoliberalism.39 She postulates that 
cocaleros have been successful in Bolivia because they identified themselves with the 
indigenous rights movement at a crucial moment when the 1994 Law of Popular 
Participation (LPP) decentralized financial and political control and extended democratic 
rights to the rural indigenous by creating municipalities that required thousands of 
representatives.40 Two years later, the 1996 Electoral Law created an opportunity for 
greater participation of indigenous people on a national level as the national Congress 
switched to a hybrid proportional representation system.  Under the new system, political 
parties sent their candidates to compete on a district level.  In the first election since the 
law was reformed, only four indigenous candidates were elected to Congress and all of 
them came from the Chapare coca growers’ movement.41   
While this dynamic demonstrates the strength of the Chapare cocaleros vis à vis 
other indigenous groups, the opportunity for the cocaleros to gain a larger share of seats 
in Congress was limited by their geographic scope.  Therefore, they needed to ally with 
other organizations to increase representation.  In 1999 elections, they did just that by 
convincing peasant organizations to adopt their party doctrine.  By 2002, the Chapare 
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38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 7. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Benjamin Kohl and Linda Farthing, Impasse in Bolivia (London: Zed Books, 2006), 126. 
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coca growers occupied one-fourth of the national Congress seats, thereby securing their 
spot as the second largest political party in Bolivia.42  Peru also decentralized control, 
granting greater power to regional or departmental governments amidst neoliberal 
reforms.  We should expect similar outcomes for cocaleros in Peru and Bolivia, but this is 
not the case.  I will utilize literature on decentralization efforts in Peru and Bolivia to 
show that laws originating at the national government level that decentralize authority 
and increase representation contribute to strong regional organization, but further 
political alliances are necessary to scale up an organization to the national level. 
Finally, some scholars identify geographic explanations for why cocaleros would 
exert national or regional influence.  Many of Peru’s coca grower troubles lie in the 
inability to readily identify an area where quality coca grew, unlike Bolivia, which grew 
the best Andean coca in the Yungas region.43 As a result, the Peruvian coca growers are 
spread out among the Huallaga Valley, in the northern highlands, and the valley between 
the Apurimac and Ene Rivers (the VRAE), and isolated areas in the south near Cuzco and 
Ayacucho, in the southern highlands.  Comparatively, Bolivia’s coca growing regions are 
limited to the Yungas region, near the capital city of La Paz, and the Chapare, in the 
nearby Cochabamba department.  Indigenous groups have always had a difficult time 
overcoming the mountainous geography of Bolivia, as it inhibits communication between 
the regions and contributes to a more regional sense of community.44  Yet the geographic 
challenges proved to be less significant than the literature suggests.  For cocaleros 
originating out of one central region (the Chapare), there was little need to look beyond 
their own region to unite coca growers.  The geography problem is more important for 
Peru, where the coca growing regions are further divided.  Geography is one factor in 
explaining the level of cocalero mobilization, but it is only a partial hypothesis. I use  
literature on social movements in Peru and Bolivia to show that geographic challenges 
can be overcome to form a national movement, but they are still an impediment to 
constructing a shared identity.   
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F. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Primary and secondary sources were used for this study.  Across time, the thesis 
begins in 1978 coinciding with some of the first cocalero mobilizations at the local level, 
and ends at the present.  Using the comparative case study method, I analyze cocaleros as 
a social movement looking specifically at framing and political opportunity structures.  
As I found evidence about the types of frames cocaleros used over time, I analyzed 
whether or not they inhibited the formation of political alliances.  From there, I infer that 
the approach of the cocalero movement either enabled a scale shift or not. 
G. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter II starts with the case of Peru, analyzing cocalero movements across time 
from the transition to democracy until the end of the Fujimori regime.  This analysis 
shows that Peru’s cocaleros tried to mobilize under closed political opportunity space 
with no results.  Chapter III analyzes the Bolivian cocalero movement in the same 
manner, showing that political alliances can lead to a scale shift, when they are pursued 
within open political opportunity space.  The fourth chapter compares the approach taken 
by Evo Morales’s MAS party in building broad based alliances with Peru’s cocalero 
attempts at modeling their movement after the MAS to achieve similar results (i.e,. a 
national movement).  The conclusion addresses the scores used to evaluate the cocalero 
movements and goes into a further discussion about the use of radical and pragmatic 
frames.  Lastly, though the focus of this thesis is on cocalero movements, the issues of 
coca eradication and alternative development combined with the findings of this thesis 
present interesting considerations for U.S. policymakers. 
  
 18 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 19 
II. PERU’S COCALEROS: FRAMED AS DRUG TRAFFICKERS 
AND PART OF SHINING PATH 
Cocalero movements in Peru and Bolivia took drastically different trajectories 
during the 1980s and 1990s.  While movements in both countries had similar beginnings 
as weak and fractured, Bolivia’s cocaleros were able to gain national recognition quickly 
through participation in an array of political alliances and later in protesting government 
eradication policies.  In sharp contrast, Peru’s cocaleros were able to muster some 
significant protests early on, but as the Shining Path established its stronghold over the 
Upper Huallaga Valley, the coca growers found themselves trapped in a violent and 
repressive conflict between the state and the insurgents.  Coca growers elsewhere in Peru 
formed regional organizations, but a lack of domestic opportunity prevented them from 
uniting.  Since Peru and Bolivia are most similar cases due to their majority indigenous 
populations, involvement in the Andean cocaine trade, and transition to democracy in the 
early 1980s, it is worthwhile examining why social movements in the two countries had 
such different experiences under democracy.  In this chapter, the focus is explaining the 
failure of Peruvian cocaleros to form a national social movement in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Chapter three will examine the Bolivian case. 
Since the United States began a worldwide war on drugs in the early 1970s, Peru 
has often found itself in the middle of the Andean trade in cocaine, supplying as much as 
60 percent of the coca leaves necessary to satisfy the world’s cocaine demand.45 The 
presence of a lucrative illicit market through the 1980s and 1990s attracted peasants, drug 
traffickers, and even Maoist guerrillas to Peru’s Upper Huallaga Valley, creating a 
complex security problem for the state.  As the United States pressured Peru to eradicate 
its coca plants in a supply-side strategy, the coca-growing peasants found themselves 
caught in a dilemma — one in which they made alliance decisions based on an economic 
logic.  Over time, cocaleros in Peru found themselves alternatively repressed either by the 
government eradication forces, or Sendero Luminoso.  While the peasants attempted to 
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organize into a social movement to defend their interests in growing the coca plant, they 
encountered great difficulties at garnering broad-based support for their grievances.   
Peru’s cocaine production chain shared similar characteristics with the other 
Andean coca producing countries as the coca growers only performed the basic tasks of 
cultivation and sometimes conversion into paste, while the mestizos did the more 
profitable work of refinement.46  The next step involved transnational actors who 
trafficked the drugs to their final destinations but rarely, if ever, had contact with the coca 
growers themselves.  With clearly defined roles for each step of the production chain, it is 
expected that the state might differentiate between the drug traffickers, processors, and 
coca growers.  However, this has not been the case in Peru.  The cocaleros of Peru 
attempted to organize into a social movement to protest forced eradication of their coca 
fields and suppression of their organization and mobilization throughout the 1980s and 
1990s.  The primary goal of the cocaleros was to convince the state to spend more on 
social programs in the rural areas, but eventually expanded to include broader issues of 
“ongoing police corruption, a failing government policy, a weak anti-drug institution and 
misappropriation of funds destined for alternative development projects.”47 The eventual 
outcome of Peru’s cocaleros at the end of the 1990s was a slew of regional cocalero 
movements, unable to mobilize nationally or realize their goals.   
The coca growers of Peru have been termed a social movement, but one that has 
had limited success and only regional influence.  In this chapter, I argue that Peru’s coca 
growing peasants were unable to scale shift the level of their movement past the regional 
level in the 1980s and 1990s because of unsuccessful framing and a lack of political 
opportunity space throughout the period.  This dynamic contrasts sharply with the 
successful framing of Bolivia’s cocalero movement as an indigenous one and later the 
building of a political party.  I then discuss why decentralization measures did not aid 
Peru’s cocaleros in expanding their networks or gaining political power as might be 
expected. 
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A. INITIAL ATTEMPTS TO FORM A COCALERO MOVEMENT 
Prior to the 1980s while Peru was still under military rule, we see the formation of 
the cocaleros as a social movement, though a weak one at inception.  With assistance 
from the United States, the government of Peru began military operations to forcibly 
eradicate coca.  Named Verde Mar I and Verde Mar II, these operations commenced in 
1979, scattering coca growers and drug traffickers alike.  At the time, coca was the most 
profitable crop, comprising 95 percent of economic activity in the Upper Huallaga 
Valley.  In response to the military incursion, the cocaleros established their first formal 
organization, the Comité Regional de Productores de Coca de la Provincia de Leoncio 
Prado y Anexo.48  It is important to note that this nascent organization began outside the 
traditional cultivation areas such as La Convención or Lares.  The cocaleros of Tingo 
María (considered the gateway to the coca growing areas of the UHV) soon mobilized en 
masse to block roads and obstruct public transportation and were met with high state 
repression at the hands of the military and police.  While their efforts may have 
contributed to the eventual transition of democracy in Peru, the cocaleros themselves did 
not succeed in their own goals to reduce state repression and permit the legal sale of coca.  
The nonviolent measures of roadblocks and obstruction attracted the attention of the 
national press, but the media framed the cocalero movement as one that merely supported 
the interests of drug traffickers, completely ignoring the social and economic grievances.  
In an obvious attempt to marginalize the cocaleros, the state used frames such as 
“guerrilleros,” “drug traffickers,” “uncivilized people who lived outside the law,” and 
“bad citizens” to describe them.49 
1. Framing and Violence in Protest 
When the protests became violent, the government placed the coca-growing 
departments of Huánuco, San Martín and Ucayali under a state of emergency, giving the 
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military full control over law enforcement.50  The cocaleros of Peru, while organized, 
were immediately placed on the defensive because of the drug trafficking frame.  In the 
words of one cocalero:  
I don’t want people to see us as criminals, as bad people. If they visited 
my modest house, they would see that we are poor, honest campesinos. 
We aren’t the drug traffickers or the terrorists of Peru! [...]Our slogan is: 
‘An honest Peruvian like you couldn’t possibly be a drug trafficker or a 
terrorist.’51  
It mattered little that few, if any of the coca growers actually ever met a trafficker.  
Because the cultivation of the coca plant was the first step in a long chain of the illicit 
cocaine trade, the frame did not have to be accurate—it only had to resonate with the 
intended audience.  In this case, the cocaleros could not make their frames resonate with 
the Peruvian people and the state’s frames dominated.  The only concrete result of their 
initial protests was the militarization of the UHV. 
At the end of their first wave of protests, the cocaleros were unable to exact any 
concessions from the military government, even though they did enter talks with the 
Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Agriculture.52  Thousands of cocaleros continued 
to protest in March 1980 in Tingo María despite continued state repression by the 
military.  The protesters had interpreted the state’s actions as a “war against the 
cocaleros”53 and organized tens of thousands of peasants into armed Frentes de Defensa 
to negotiate with the central government and protect against abuse by the rural police 
units.54  One successful frame the cocaleros used to mobilize in this period was the 
slogan, “Better to die on your feet than to live on your knees.”55  After 11 days of protest, 
the authoritarian Morales Bermúdez government granted concessions to the cocaleros, 
promising them a legal outlet for the sale of coca through the National Coca Enterprise 
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(ENACO), a legal market established in 1978 to commercialize and industrialize coca for 
legal purposes such as pharmaceuticals and Coca-Cola extract.56  
2. Cocalero Problems with Identity  
As previously discussed, framing a movement in terms that mobilizes a broader 
section of the general population is key to success for any group with a social grievance, 
and is especially so for the cocaleros.  Bolivia’s cocaleros successfully framed their 
movement as an indigenous one as early as the 1980s, utilizing previously established 
political alliances to further their goals.  However, in the case of Peru, coca growers did 
not so much organize along indigenous lines, but rather were forced to form their identity 
around class as a result of the Marxist doctrines held by Sendero Luminoso.57  Moreover, 
Peru’s cocaleros had little incentive to frame their movement as an indigenous one in the 
1980s and 1990s.  Since most coca growers in Peru came from an indigenous 
background, they shared common feelings of social exclusion as well as abandonment by 
the state and a deep sense of injustice.  Yet they had great difficulty constructing a shared 
identity due to several factors:  Coca growers came from different ethnicities and 
backgrounds, but most importantly, they were geographically divided over 10 
departments encompassing 14 regions.  Additionally, the frames of violence attributed to 
the coca growing regions and the cocaleros dependence on the illegal cocaine industry 
during the 1980s severely inhibited the political ascent of the cocaleros as Peru 
consolidated its democracy.58  
B. LACK OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONAL SPACE 
1. International Pressures 
While frames are an integral part of mustering support and enabling the scale shift 
of a social movement, political opportunities usually dictate when and if a movement 
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decides to protest.  In Peru during the 1980s, there were very few domestic or 
international political opportunities for cocaleros.  International pressure, especially the 
financial pressure exerted by the United States played a large role in keeping 
opportunities low for Peru’s cocaleros.  The newly democratic government of Fernando 
Belaúnde was especially susceptible to the carrot and stick approach of foreign 
governments and international institutions.  Paul Gootenberg writes that Peru’ coca 
growers in the 1980s and beyond were much less susceptible to the external pressures 
than the previous controllers of the coca market, the landed elites.59  In other words, 
threats against cocaleros that originated from foreign powers had little effect on behavior.  
The U.S. in particular had other ways to exert its influence on the coca-cocaine issue.  
Between certification legislation enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1986 and the direct 
funding of military and police operations, the U.S. maintained significant leverage over 
the Belaúnde government.  The certification process served to ensure that the coca-
producing countries were in full compliance with U.S. anti-drug policies.  If a country 
was not up to U.S. standards, it faced the withdrawal of all economic assistance, denial of 
loans from international financial institutions (IFIs), and the removal of trade 
preferences.60  One of the ways the U.S. was able to ensure international support for their 
certification policy was by referencing a United Nations agreement signed by the Andean 
countries stating that they would eliminate the growth of coca within their borders and 
even coca chewing within 25 years.61  While Peru’s government did sign the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1961, the actions it took to combat drug trafficking and 
coca cultivation between that time and the 1980s was minimal and ineffective.  When the 
U.S. began directly funding military and police operations in coca cultivation areas, it 
was accompanied with a threat to retract aid, thus eliciting repressive state action against 
cocaleros.  The international pressure worked quite effectively as the state responded and 
subsequently denied cocaleros domestic opportunity.  
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2. Shining Path Coercion and National Antinarcotics Policy 
Peru’s transition to democracy in 1980 seemingly provided a domestic 
opportunity for cocaleros to be seen as valid interlocutors with the government, but this 
was not the case.  As Peru was the main source country for cocaine in the 1980s, the U.S. 
administration under President Ronald Reagan focused efforts and convinced Peru’s first 
democratically elected president since military rule, Fernando Belaúnde, to begin two 
special projects to combat the supply side of cocaine.  One such project was CORAH, 
and contained the forcible action arm of the two projects.  The other project, PEAH, was 
meant to complement CORAH by finding suitable crops to replace eradicated coca.62 
CORAH’s eradication mission used exclusively manual means to eradicate the coca bush, 
therefore requiring significant manpower and direct contact with coca growers.  The U.S. 
financed a rural law enforcement agency (UMOPAR) to oversee the implementation of 
CORAH’s mission, though President Alan García (1985-1990) dismantled the 
organization before the end of the 1980s due to corruption and ineffectiveness.63 Because 
of the international pressure that manifested in the creation of CORAH and UMOPAR, 
Peru’s transition to democracy did not yield a domestic opportunity for cocaleros.  
Despite few domestic opportunities, cocaleros protested in 1982 when President 
Belaúnde again prohibited the cocaleros of the UHV from selling their leaves to ENACO.  
Thousands of cocaleros marched to Tingo María to protest their exclusion from the legal 
trade.  The government made concessions to the protesters after 11 days.  Through 
passage of Law 23505, ENACO activities could be resumed in the UHV, but no new 
cocaleros could register their crops.  Mirela Van Dun writes that while these concessions 
were made into law, “[The law] also entailed that the registration of 1978 would be 
binding and no new inscriptions would be allowed. As a consequence, the majority of 
cocaleros in the Upper Huallaga remained illegal cultivators.”64 
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Inhibiting cocaleros from a further scale shift were the radical leftist groups that 
suppressed all rival organization in the rural coca producing areas.  The insurgent 
violence from Sendero Luminoso and subsequent state repression without a doubt 
impeded the ascent of cocaleros as a social movement through the 1980s and into the 
1990s.  This occurred in sharp contrast to Bolivia’s cocaleros, who peacefully 
unionized.65  Peru’s experience in the 1980s sharply contrasts with that of Bolivia in that 
there were “no strongly organized confederations of coca grower trade unions in 
Peru...capable of defending the interests of the UHV peasants against the coca eradication 
campaigns of the government.”66 This lack of representation allowed the Shining Path 
guerrillas to occupy the gap that might have been filled by trade unions. 
As mentioned previously, cocaleros could not frame their movement as 
indigenous because they were forced by Sendero to adopt a Marxist class identity as 
peasants.  Deborah Yashar argues that while the previous decades in Peru failed to 
manifest networks for indigenous or ethnic mobilization, “the subsequent civil war 
actually destroyed networks and closed off political associational space.”67 With few 
allies, the cocaleros had nowhere to turn but into the repressive embrace of Sendero.   
The guerrillas of Sendero Luminoso arrived in the UHV in the late 1970s to early 
1980s, using the original cocalero protests to incite violence against the government.  The 
absence of state presence in this remote area of Peru led to high levels of coca cultivation 
and rapidly became a haven for the Maoist Sendero Luminoso guerrillas as well as their 
rival Túpac Amaru army, leaving those involved in cocalero politics to be later referred 
to as “invisible actors.”68 As the Belaúnde administration pressed forward into 
eradication of the coca fields, the cocaleros found themselves caught between the 
CORAH/UMOPAR teams and the Shining Path insurgents.   
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The guerillas of Sendero imposed a strict moral code that “atomized, alienated, 
and harassed”69 cocaleros, giving them reason to ally with the military forces sent to 
protect coca eradication teams.  Moreover, this blending of the two groups made it 
difficult for the coca growers to frame in any way that would attract other sectors of 
society.  A particularly effective yet gruesome tactic used by Sendero involved 
eliminating any organizational leadership, even if the two groups shared similar goals.70  
In Peru, there was only room for Sendero.  Deborah Yashar writes that Sendero 
“destroyed potential frameworks for legal organizing along ethnic lines—destroying the 
communication links for sharing experiences, for the rise in alternative leaders, and for 
the maintenance of organizations working on related issues.”71  Sendero quickly 
recognized the coca-cocaine trade could be useful source of funding for their insurgency, 
and assumed an exclusive role between the coca growers and the drug traffickers.  
Cocaleros initially welcomed Sendero’s protection from the CORAH and UMOPAR 
eradication teams, but other exacting measures took their toll.  A revolutionary tax was 
imposed on cocaleros, forcing them to surrender a fifth of their coca crop.  Additionally, 
Sendero imposed strict moral rules intended to stem a wave of crime associated with the 
recent colonizers of the UHV.  Under the code, “Shining Path instituted punishments and 
penalties for those deemed undesirable, such as fumones; homosexuals; thieves; women 
suspected of sexual relations with police or the military; traqueteros who deceived 
cocaleros; and adulterers.”72 The cocaleros initially welcomed this form of social 
cleansing, but Sendero’s paranoia over enemy informers led them to use summary 
executions over the slightest accusation—a practice that was easily abused and 
subsequently alienated the population.73  
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When the government finally realized in 1984 that the eradication efforts in the 
UHV were unsuccessful due to continued attacks from the Shining Path, it placed the 
area in charge of the Peruvian Army under General Julio Carbajal.  The new strategy 
taken by the general involved driving a wedge between the peasants and the Shining 
Path.  He confined UMOPAR to their barracks and allowed the CORAH eradication 
teams to be massacred by the insurgents and drug traffickers.  When the cocaleros 
realized they had an opening to side with either the army (who would not eradicate their 
crops) or the Shining Path (who taxed them and imposed a harsh moral code), the 
peasants chose the army.74 The military was eventually pulled out of the UHV in 1985 
when Alan García became president even though the civil war continued with cocaleros 
caught in the middle.   
A possible domestic opportunity presented itself in the early 1990s when 
President Alberto Fujimori was elected President of Peru.  At first, Fujimori took a 
drastically different approach to drug control under what is called the Fujimori Doctrine.  
Fujimori did not consider the coca growers to be equally nefarious as the rest of the drug 
traffickers in his country and instead wanted to promote economic development and open 
access to legal markets.  In April of 1991, a new penal code removed the coca growers 
from the criminal chain of drug trafficking.  Additionally contributing to a political 
opening, forced eradication had ceased in the UHV by 1989, contributing to a decline in 
cocalero support for Sendero.75  While this important combination of openings could 
have contributed to the stronger organization of cocaleros, other factors discouraged them 
from doing so in this period.  First, coca prices were in decline as a result of increased 
interdiction of drug traffickers.  Lower demand meant suppressed wages.  Second, a 
fungus destroyed coca bushes along the Huallaga River.  With the economic benefit of 
growing the coca plant in the UHV diminished, coca growers migrated to other regions, 
especially in the departments of Cusco and Apurímac.  Spread over hundreds of miles of 
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forbidding terrain, the migrating cocaleros of Peru created a new barrier to 
organization.76   
After the failures of cocalero organization in the 1980s, various attempts to 
organize a national or international cocalero movement emerged.  In March of 1991, 
Peru’s coca growers helped organize an international cocalero movement, Consejo 
Andino de Productores de Hoja de Coca (CAPHC).  However, the movement gained 
little support from the largest coca-producing areas in Peru due to the violent conflict 
between the state and Sendero.  CAPHC gained the most support from Peru’s cocaleros 
in the department of Cusco, as Sendero had a minimal presence there.  One of Peru’s own 
coca leaders, Hugo Cabieses, was poised to assume leadership of the international 
cocalero movement in 1998, but he declined to succeed Evo Morales leading to the 
demise of the organization that same year.77  In this case, a domestic and international 
opportunity was available, yet Peru’s cocaleros were neither organized on a national level 
nor capitalize on the existing networks. 
At the end of the state’s struggle with Sendero in the 1990s, many regional 
cocalero movements emerged, but the national level movement could not unite them.  In 
February of 1998, a group of cocalero leaders organized Coordinadora Nacional de 
Productores Agricolas (CONAPA), which was a national movement intended to unite the 
regional federations.  There were four regional organizations that participated in 
CONAPA, all from the coca-producing regions of Peru.  From Cusco, cocaleros 
organized as the Federación Provincial de Campesinos de la Convención, Yanatile y 
Lares (FEPCACYL) joined CONAPA; from the Apurimac-Ene Valley, the Federación 
de Productores Agropecuarios del Valle del Río Apurímac y Ene (FEPAVRAE); from the 
UHV, the Asociación de Agricultores y Productores de Hoja de Coca del Alto Huallaga, 
Monzón y Padre Abad (AAPHC-AHMPA); and lastly, from the Puno department, the 
Asociación de Productores y Agricultores de Hoja de Coca de la Selva de Puno 
                                                 
76 Ibid. 387. 
77 Van Dun, Cocaleros: Violence, Drugs and Social Mobilization in the Post-Conflict Upper Huallaga 
Valley, Peru, 201. 
 30 
(APCOCAS).78  Despite organizing nationally, the cocaleros were unable to forge a 
political alliance with the Movimiento Campesino Nacional that would have signaled a 
scale shift in their movement to the national level.  
C. INABILITY TO SCALE UP FOLLOWING DECENTRALIZATION 
A final factor not addressed thus far that is crucial when considering the 
formation of cocalero movements and, more generally, the ability of a social movement 
to scale shift, is the question of decentralization. As we will see for the case of Bolivia in 
the 1990s, decentralization can very effectively pave the way for the bottom-up formation 
of a strong cocalero movement. However, Peru in the 1980s and 1990s shows us the 
limits of decentralization as a causal factor.  In particular, in the Peruvian case, we see 
decentralization efforts in the 1980s provided political opportunities, but cocaleros were 
ill prepared to capitalize on those opportunities.  In the 1990s, a recentralization of power 
under President Fujimori gave him the ability to co-opt sectors of society, keeping social 
movements such as the cocaleros from forging political alliances or mobilizing in any 
significant way.  
In 1980, Peru’s new constitution enacted sweeping decentralization measures 
designed to allow the popular election of mayors and fiscal transfers to local 
governments.  This was done under the Belaúnde administration when the leftist party 
American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) dominated the constitutional 
assembly.79 While this measure in theory could have provided Peru’s cocaleros an 
opportunity to gain influence at least on a local level, Sendero Luminoso’s strict policy of 
not allowing any rival organization prohibited them from taking advantage of a political 
opening. 
Peru’s next decentralization measure did not come until 1989, when the direct 
election of regional governors was approved.  President Alan García’s APRA party 
lacked national level support and had a poor showing in the 1989 municipal contests.  
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This measure did not create an opportunity for cocaleros, but instead was a last resort 
measure by García to secure high-level positions for the members of his party.  
Furthermore, automatic transfers of fiscal resources did not accompany this 
decentralization measure, something that was included in 1980.  The election of Alberto 
Fujimori to the presidency in 1990 under his own Cambio 90 party without a doubt 
signaled the breakdown of traditional parties in Peru.80  In Bolivia, this dynamic favored 
the formation of a cocalero-based party, but in Peru, cocaleros were not organized 
enough to capitalize on this opportunity. 
Following Fujimori’s self-coup in 1992, a constitutional referendum was 
confirmed by a slim margin in 1993 that recentralized power in the executive branch.  In 
postponed municipal elections that same year, Fujimori’s party won a mere three percent 
of the vote, forcing him to realize that he retained little support at the local level.  
Fujimori soon took away the ability for opposition candidates to organize at the 
municipal level through several measures.  First, he lowered the number of signatures 
candidates would be required to gather, leading to a situation where a surprising thirty-
eight candidates ran for the office of mayor in one municipality.81  Second, Fujimori 
abolished the automatic financial transfers to the municipal governments.  This allowed 
him to deal with groups like the cocaleros in a scheme of clientelism, which some have 
termed “neopopulism,” since he implemented neoliberal market policies while appealing 
to the masses.82 
D. CONCLUSION 
In summary, Peru’s coca growers lacked domestic opportunities to scale shift the 
level of their movement, and were unsuccessful at conveying a frame favorable to their 
organization in the 1980s and 1990s.  Instead, the state both repressed cocalero 
organization and framed them as drug traffickers, while the Shining Path guerrillas 
simultaneously imposed a revolutionary tax and strict moral code in the Upper Huallaga 
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Valley.  Eventually, the cocaleros sided with the army under General Carvajal, but the 
civil war continued and destroyed any chance for cocaleros to make political alliances.  
U.S. pressure for a supply-side drug control strategy throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
played a key role in keeping domestic opportunities low for cocaleros. When Alberto 
Fujimori became President, his neopopulist appeals created a political opening for 
cocalero organization as the Fujimori doctrine viewed coca growers as valid 
interlocutors.  Even when it seemed like Peru’s cocaleros were ready to scale shift their 
movement, the leadership did not manifest itself and the coca growers remained 
fractionalized.   
While Peru’s early democratic governments enacted decentralization measures, 
they were a non-factor for the cocaleros.  Organizationally, the cocaleros were too 
repressed to take advantage of the two measures in the 1980s.  In the 1990s, instead of 
decentralizing political power down to the municipality level, Fujimori recentralized the 
system and was able to co-opt cocalero leaders throughout the 1990s. 
 33 
III. BOLIVIA’S COCALEROS: FRAMING AND OPPORTUNITIES 
Bolivia’s coca growers traditionally have chewed coca leaves to suppress the 
appetite and fight off altitude sickness.  The practice that continues in the present is very 
much a part of their indigenous identity.83  Yet in recent decades, the increasing world 
demand for cocaine has overshadowed this tradition.  Kevin Healy estimates that during 
cocaine’s peak years, some 500,000–1,000,000 Bolivian inhabitants from the social 
groups of peasants and farmers derived their income from coca production, trade, and 
trafficking activities.84 While the peasants or campesinos traditionally filled the role of 
coca cultivation, the whites and mestizos from the richer parts of Bolivia undertook the 
other steps in the cocaine production chain.85  The next step involved transnational actors 
who trafficked the drugs to their final destinations but rarely, if ever, had contact with the 
coca growers themselves.  At different times throughout Bolivia’s history, coca growers 
have also entered the coca-paste market, usually due to a drop in coca prices because of 
government repression.86 Indeed, government repression has played a large role in the 
formation of Bolivia’s cocalero movement, especially during the 1980s and 1990s.   
The following analysis of the Bolivian cocalero movement will first examine the 
hypotheses of international and national pressure, arguing that frames using indigenous 
and peasant discourse made it possible for Bolivia’s cocaleros to forge political alliances 
through the 1980s and 1990s.  These mobilizing frames allowed the cocaleros to scale 
shift the level of their movement from a regionally based one in the Yungas and Chapare 
to the formation of a National movement.  Second, I examine the hypothesis that 
favorable geography enabled a scale shift for the cocaleros movement in Bolivia since 
their strength of their movement originated in one central location, the Chapare.  Lastly, I 
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will discuss decentralization as a factor that contributed to the formation of a national 
political party based on coca related grievances, but ultimately rule it out as a causal 
factor for a scale shift.   
A. SUCCESSFUL FRAMING AS INDIGENOUS AND PEASANTS 
On the international level, decades-old agreements began to take effect in the 
1980s prompting the newly democratic government of Bolivia to address the coca issue.  
The United Nations had definitively pronounced coca an illicit substance in 1961 as part 
of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.  As party to the convention, the 
governments of both Peru and Bolivia agreed to eliminate coca cultivation within 20 
years, and the traditional practice of coca chewing within 25 years.87 Then, in 1986, the 
U.S. began a certification process to ensure that drug-producing countries were in full 
compliance with U.S. anti-drug policies.  If a country was not up to U.S. standards, it 
faced the withdrawal of all economic assistance, denial of loans from IFIs, and the 
removal of trade preferences.88 The recently transitioned democratic government of Siles 
Zuazo (1982-1985) faced mounting inflation and other financial woes, problems that 
would most certainly be exacerbated with a removal of foreign aid.  Compounding the 
problem, the utter lack of measures enacted by the previous military governments and 
tacit endorsement of the illegal drug trade led to a flourishing of illicit cocaine markets.  
Though coca growers denied involvement in cocaine production, they became the 
primary targets for U.S. anti-drug policy vis à vis the Bolivian government.89 The U.S. 
either directly funded military and police operations in coca cultivation areas, or they 
threatened the government of Bolivia with a retraction of aid, eliciting repressive action 
against cocaleros.  The U.S. also attempted to frame Bolivia’s cocaleros as drug  
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traffickers, as it was successfully done in Peru.  Such a mischaracterization by the U.S. 
failed to resonate with some of Bolivia’s leaders, though others have adopted it 
wholeheartedly.   
The first democratically elected president of Bolivia since the transition, Hernán 
Siles Zuazo, initially viewed cocaleros as a central part of his Unidad Democrática y 
Popular (UPD) party’s center-left constituency that brought an end to military rule in 
Bolivia (1964-82).  However, Siles later decreed 4,000 hectares of coca be eradicated by 
1985 to stop the U.S. from withdrawing financial aid.90 While this angered cocaleros in 
the early 1980s, the action that incited them to mobilize had more to do with the 
marketing strategy to control coca.  Before Siles took office, the military government had 
set up a network of wholesale distribution centers to control the coca leaf.  The measures 
were unpopular with the coca-growing peasants because of the low prices and corruption 
in the way they were run.  When Siles attempted to increase the role of the state in the 
wholesale marketing and international distribution of coca, peasant union activists 
occupied the wholesale facilities in the Chapare and destroyed them.91  
Faced with a loss of their rights to grow and market coca, cocaleros in the 
Chapare began seeking out alliances with the peasant union organizations in the upper 
Cochabamba Valley and later the most important national peasant union in Bolivia.  
Before long the Chapare cocaleros had influence in the highest level of Bolivia’s all-
encompassing labor union the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB).  The cocalero movement 
in Bolivia then made impressive gains in through the 1980s as they expanded their 
political power within the networks of peasant and labor sindicatos (unions).  However, 
Bolivian cocaleros did not succeed in gaining many seats in the national parliament 
during this decade.  Their initial success can primarily be attributed to successful framing 
as indigenous and peasants.   
Cocaleros in the 1980s were most often thought of among the urban elite and the 
mestizo population as indigenous peasant farmers, in part due to their imitation of some 
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of the previously successful social movements.  The most prominent Bolivian social 
movement of the 1960s and 1970s, the Kataristas, were the entrepreneurs of the 
indigenous frame.  These individuals successfully organized along indigenous lines 
during periods of military rule and eventually attained leadership positions in the peasant 
unions.  Katarista leaders were at the forefront of the unified peasant confederation 
named the Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia 
(CSUTCB).  The federation was successful in bringing ethnic demands into policy 
debates, though most of their proposals for communal property rights and political 
autonomy were never voted on in the national Congress.92 Building on the success of the 
Kataristas, the cocaleros adopted the indigenous discourse in the 1980s as a tool for 
organizing.  The reason for adopting the indigenous frame had a lot to do with political 
opportunity.  Domestically, the Kataristas had secured extensive networks in the urban 
spaces, while the peasant-based movements worked to secure the rural areas.93 By 
adopting the indigenous frame, cocaleros hoped to make alliances in the urban sectors, 
and by adopting the peasant frame, the rural organizations.  Gaining influence within the 
Katarista-founded CSUTCB was made easier across disparate geography as the Chapare 
cocaleros reached out to the peasant federations in the two other coca-growing regions: 
the Yungas provinces (in the department of La Paz) and the Yapacane area (in the 
department of Santa Cruz). 
The Chapare cocaleros, mostly migrant farmers and displaced miners, were 
especially important in framing the movement.  The former tin miners in particular 
possessed a large repertoire for collective action; the skills were learned during protests 
under repressive military rule.94 
There is little doubt that the Chapare coca growers, organized as the Federación 
Especial de Trabajadores Campesinos del Trópico de Cochabamba (FETCTC), were the 
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single most influential member of the CSUTCB in the 1980s.  The FETCTC was able to 
establish the Comisión de Coca as a permanent working committee in the CSUTCB 
congress, which brought the coca leaf to its position as a leading concern in all 
discussion.95  Healy writes that in the mid to late 1980s, the coca producer federations 
surpassed the labor militancy of even the Bolivian mine workers.96  Under authoritarian 
military rule in Bolivia from the 1970s to 1982, tin miners were the primary activists that 
participated in protests and ultimately forced the transition to democracy.97 
Though frames of indigenous and peasant plight did not resonate with the 
mestizos and whites, cocaleros did find numerous partners to grow their movement 
throughout the decade.  The Chapare federations were able to leverage not only the 
CSUTCB peasant delegations in the region, but their political allies as well.98 The 
movement began to grow in strength as cocaleros replicated the success of the Kataristas 
in framing their movement as an indigenous one.99  By organizing as an indigenous 
group, the cocaleros were able to attract attention from other indigenous groups that 
welcomed them in a political alliance.  Especially in the coca-chewing (as opposed to 
coca producing) regions of Chuquisaca, Potosí and Oruro, the common indigenous and 
cultural connection was vitally important.  As part of the national CSUTCB congress, 
peasants representatives from those regions would carry back messages concerning the 
threat to the “sacred leaf” which further strengthened solidarity for the cocaleros.100 
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B. POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONAL SPACE  
The local unions were vital to cocaleros in the 1980s for the channeling their 
grievances.  Kevin Healy writes: 
The union experience combined with external political threats also has 
propelled the peasantry to organize the Asociacion Nacional de 
Productores de Coca (ANAPCOCA) with representatives from the coca 
leaf growing zones of the regions of La Paz, Santa Cruz, and 
Cochabamba.101  
ANAPCOCA enabled the Chapare cocaleros to solidify support around the coca 
leaf in an organizational structure that paralleled that of the CSUTCB.  However, the 
organization had limited power on its own; the real strength goal of the Chapare 
cocaleros was not merely to consolidate their support among other coca growers, but to 
secure their autonomy and position representatives at the highest levels of the national 
government.  To do this, they needed the CSUTCB and their encompassing organization, 
the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB).  Bank employees, teachers, peasants, miners, 
factory workers, trade unions, and labor of all kind fell under the purview of the COB.  
The activism of the Chapare coca growing federations however, was unique among all of 
the COB’s constituents.  When the role of other labor groups weakened in the 1980s as 
result of neoliberal economic reforms, the CSUTCB lobbied for a stronger role within the 
COB.102   
Domestic opportunities seemed high for cocaleros to protest leading up to 1985.  
Yet in 1985, the Movimiento Revolucionario Nacional (MNR), a right of center party, 
won back power under President Victor Paz Estensorro signaling the end of union power.  
His policies represent the beginning of neoliberal economic reform in Bolivia, as he 
privatized many state-run enterprises and began structural adjustment programs endorsed 
by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Postero writes that the 
power of unions to summon popular support through protest began to wane in the wake 
of these reforms.  However, where the power was diminishing is important.  The rural 
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areas did experience lower levels of support for the peasant unions, with the exception of 
the CSUTCB and their main force for action, the cocaleros.  Postero contributes this 
reduction of influence to the closure of the mines and subsequent relocation of miners as 
a result of structural adjustment policies. The neoliberal policies that halted inflation and 
privatized the mines also provided a political opening for the return of democratic 
processes including representation, a role previously held closely by the labor unions.103  
While these policies seemingly should have ended the cocaleros’ main source of 
organization, they merely strengthened the resolve of cocaleros and bolstered their 
numbers as many of the former miners became coca growers in the Chapare.  Once 
organized in unions, the cocaleros presented a bigger target for state eradication policies.  
At this point the cocaleros began to adopt a strong nationalist sentiment in response to 
state attempts to marginalize their movement.  
Nationalist rhetoric had a strong influence on the ability of Bolivian cocaleros to 
frame themselves in a positive manner through the 1980s and 1990s.  Anti-US discourse 
was especially important in mutually reinforcing the doctrinal positions of the CSUTCB 
and the COB.  The U.S. military led Operation Blast Furnace in 1986 was particularly 
helpful event in stirring nationalist sentiment against what many perceived as a violation 
of national sovereignty.  Even though the operation only targeted drug processing labs 
and not the coca itself, the destruction of the labs disrupted the market for Bolivian coca 
leaves as drug traffickers fled the area.  The U.S.-financed rural law enforcement agency 
UMOPAR (Unidad Movile de Patrullaje Rural) was also a tangible enemy that the 
cocaleros could use to mobilize group members. 
In 1988, the Ley de Regimen de la Coca y Sustancias Contraladas, or Law 1008, 
provided yet another rallying point for the Chapare cocaleros as it essentially 
criminalized coca cultivation outside of the Yungas.  Bolivia’s coca growers were subject 
to their first major confrontation with their government over eradication of the coca plant 
when Law 1008 was implemented by Víctor Paz Estenssoro in response to the U.S. 
Congress passing the 1985 Foreign Assistance Act “authorizing the president to decertify 
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and terminate aid to any country considered out of compliance with U.S. anti-drug 
objectives.”104 The law permitted 12,000 hectares of coca to be grown in the Yungas for 
traditional use—an amount supposedly sufficient for national demand.105 However, in 
the Chapare, where thousands of laid off tin miners had migrated at the start of the 
decade in response to government incentives, no coca was permitted.  Though the 
government had intended for the tin miners to switch to agriculture, it did not anticipate 
the challenges of both growing produce and delivering it to a market in a reasonable 
timeframe.  Most of the migrants became primarily subsistence farmers who grew coca as 
their cash crop in the Chapare.  The past experience of the tin miners in engaging in 
active protest partially explains why the Chapare coca unions were the most active and 
militant labor federation through the 1980s.  The international pressure did provide an 
eventual impetus for cocalero organization, as the U.S. law prompted the Bolivian 
government under Paz to agree to an aggressive approach to coca eradication.   
C. THE REPERTOIRE OF PROTEST: TACTICS TO GAIN SUPPORTERS 
Coca leaf producers have a large repertoire of actions for public protest when 
threatened by government policy, actions, and laws.  They include sit-ins at government 
facilities, hunger strikes, mass rallies, marches, and road blockades.  Healy posits that the 
most effective form of protest in Bolivia has been the road blockade, which galvanizes 
hundreds of local unions.  When it comes to tactics, Bolivia contrasts with Peru in that 
the cocaleros never have aligned with guerrilla movements, instead pursuing nonviolent 
pressure and defense tactics.106  
Road blockades were most effective tactic in the 1980s, as the Siles government 
responded to protest pressure from the Chapare coca growers by granting the right to 
market the coca leaf independent of government control.  However, the government 
overturned the measure within six months, a result of U.S. pressure.  In this case, 
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cocaleros were able to muster their support through peasant congresses across the 
country.  The National Association of Coca Producers (ANAPCOCA) was instrumental 
in coordinating the blockade of major highways in the altiplano and in the lowland Santa 
Cruz that led to the government’s accommodation.107  When cocaleros saw that the road 
blocking tactics were more effective than violent resistance, it became the primary tactic 
in the repertoire for the next two decades.    
D. DECENTRALIZATION AIDS THE FORMATION OF A POLITICAL 
PARTY 
The neoliberal reforms set in place in the 1980s presented a both an opportunity 
and a challenge for social movements in the 1990s, one that eventually led to 
decentralization efforts.  Literature suggests that decentralization reforms may lead to the 
scale shift of a movement as its actors are increasingly able to participate in a 
representative government and bring their grievances to the policy arena.  This section 
shows how neoliberal reforms led to Bolivia’s most important decentralization law, 
which in turn provided cocaleros with exposure in electoral politics and a consolidation 
of power in the Chapare.  Because cocaleros were already utilizing the union structure, 
they found repeated success at municipal level elections, which eventually led to the 
formation of a political party.  Though decentralization in the Bolivia case was not the 
crucial factor enabling a scale shift of the movement, it did help form the cocalero-
controlled MAS party.  The way in which Bolivia’s cocaleros took advantage of 
decentralization contrasts with the Peru case, where cocaleros were unprepared and 
highly repressed from having power outside Sendero Luminoso’s class-centered 
organization.   
The neoliberal reforms of the 1980s stirred up long-standing conflicts between 
elites and indigenous peoples, and gave autonomy proponents a greater chance at 
securing their interests.  The cocaleros found themselves in the middle of these conflicts. 
How were they expected to frame their movement in this decade?  The class centered and 
ethnic discourse used by cocaleros in the 1980s worked to secure them high level 
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positions within national organizations like the COB.  Though influential in peasant 
worker organizations, little progress was made in gaining seats in Parliament or in the 
formation of a political party that would represent their interests.  The new administration 
of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (1993-1997), commonly known as “Goni,” attempted to 
streamline access to government in an attempt to ease some of the tension within the 
country.  He designed a plan that would emphasize peasant and indigenous rights in a 
way that would not interfere with free market forces.  During his administration, he 
“reinvented [Bolivia] with an all-encompassing programme that fully fleshed out the 
neoliberal policies introduced during the 1985 New Economic Policy (NEP).”108 Goni 
saw the government’s role as the mediator between the international community and the 
Bolivian people.  It was to be a critical role in the newly globalized economy composed 
of IFIs and private investment firms.  While the 1952 revolution hoped to create a 
modern mestizo state, the plan in the 1990s was to create a multicultural state that was 
decentralized and postmodern.109  Thus, the Bolivian constitution was revised in 1994 
with goals to address “underlying and ongoing tensions in the country’s history: regional 
autonomy vs. centralized government, and indigenous vs. elite demands.”110 The most 
important law the Parliament passed affecting cocaleros during Goni’s administration 
was the 1994 Law of Popular Participation (Law 1551), which specifically named 
indigenous actors as participants in the local political system.111  
While the cocaleros were happy to frame their movement as indigenous and gain 
access to local municipal governments, this had already been accomplished by the time 
the LPP took effect.112 Rather, the Sanchez de Lozada administration’s decentralization 
initiative can be seen as a “deliberate attempt by the country’s central government to 
fragment, localize, and pacify popular social movements.”113  Kohl and Farthing also 
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note that an unstated goal of the 1985 neoliberal NEP was to destroy the power of the 
COB and popular resistance with it.114 Goni realized he needed to include the indigenous 
in political processes to stem the waves of protest originating from the rural indigenous 
and peasant groups.  By accepting the cocaleros’ own frame as indigenous, he expected 
to marginalize and pacify the movement.  When he ran for office in 1993, Goni made a 
strategic choice in picking the indigenous Aymara, Víctor Hugo Cárdenas, as his vice 
president.  The cocaleros had already framed their struggle as an indigenous one in the 
prior decade.  Thus, while Goni thought his reforms could address the plight of 
indigenous people and that they could be co-opted through decentralization, he failed to 
realize that the cocaleros were the center of gravity of the indigenous movement and 
would not be deterred so easily from pursuing their goals of legal coca markets or 
alternative development. 
Raúl Madrid confirms that decentralization was a non-factor for cocaleros 
participation in municipal elections, though he does acknowledge that the Law of Popular 
Participation helps explain the formation of the MAS.  The constitutional reforms of 1994 
directly facilitated greater participation of Cocaleros in the legislature as it created 
“smaller single-member districts for elections to one tier of the lower chamber of the 
legislature.”115 Yet Madrid rules out this explanation for the rise of the MAS, as the party 
would likely have earned the same number of seats in the legislature under the old 
system. 
E. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE COCA-COCAINE ISSUE ON THE 
BOLIVIAN ECONOMY 
The defense of a regional economic base became very important for certain 
regional elites in Bolivia toward the end of the 1980s and into the 1990s.  Hoping to 
expand their constituencies to include rural areas, Congressional leaders and political 
hopefuls made the plight of the cocaleros a centerpiece of their campaigns.  One 
predecessor to the MAS, the Izquierda Unidad (IU) opposition political front took 44 
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percent of the vote in the Chapare province during the 1989 presidential elections touting 
its platform of opposition to Bolivian and U.S. drug control policies.116  Correspondence 
from a congressional leader in the left of center Vanguardia 9 Party showed that if coca 
eradication were successful in the region of Cochabamba that he represented, it would 
require $3 billion to recover from the impact it would have on the regional economy.117 
The motivations for the political elite to ally with cocaleros are evidenced in this case; 
elites correctly saw the economy as the key to their own legitimacy and position—
something that would be compromised if the peasants were not allowed to grow coca.   
It would be a misrepresentation of the elite to say that alliances with cocaleros 
were common in Bolivia because of coca’s effect on the local economies.  Elites 
elsewhere, such as those who were part of the Confederación de Empresarios Privados 
(CEP), the Bolivian businessmen’s association, opposed coca cultivation and lobbied the 
U.S. government for financial assistance to achieve the goal.  The underlying motivation 
seems to be easily revealed as increases in the U.S. foreign aid budget were to be made in 
ways that specifically benefitted the business elites, including hard currency and financial 
credits that could be invested in the national economy.118 
The coca and cocaine industry became so profitable and important to Bolivia’s 
economy at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s that President Jaime Paz 
Zamora began to factor the direct and indirect costs of coca eradication into his requests 
for aid from the U.S. government.  Bolivian planners in 1990 estimated that $490 million 
per year was the necessary amount to substitute the illegal economy.119  An additional 
$449 was deemed necessary to cover the indirect costs of the market, according to Kevin 
Healy.  The economic data suggests that it was not so much cocalero activism that 
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propelled the government to adopt this position, but rather the expansion of many 
peasants into the coca paste-making industry.120 
In 1995, Bolivia failed to meet coca eradication targets established earlier in Law 
1008.  In response, the U.S. government decertified Bolivia, endangering financial aid 
provided by the U.S. and other multilateral agencies.  The government of Sanchez de 
Lozada had avoided direct confrontation with the coca growers in his attempt to keep the 
country’s primary focus on the NEP, but a lack of foreign investment also threatened to 
derail his plan.  By this point in Goni’s administration the informal economy accounted 
for as much as half of all economic activity in Bolivia.  Coca and cocaine were a large 
part of the economy, along with contraband and remittances.  It appeared the NEP was 
working, but for the as many as two-thirds of Bolivians, the only place to find work was 
in the informal sector, especially the coca trade.121 For Goni to keep the economy 
churning at its current rate, he had to depend on both the informal economy and foreign 
aid—a combination that soon proved to be mutually exclusive.122  Under duress, Goni 
militarized the Chapare and eradicated the minimum number of coca plants necessary to 
restore Bolivia’s standing with the United States.   
The economy is important to mention in this chapter because the importance of 
the coca-cocaine industry to Bolivia’s economy is and was far greater than more 
developed and diversified countries like Peru and Colombia.  Bolivia’s heavy reliance on 
foreign financial assistance after its transition to democracy has made their governments 
highly susceptible to the anti-coca initiatives usually tied to any assistance.  The impact 
on cocalero mobilization is that there is a cycle of protest, negotiation and appeasement, 
forced eradication, and back to protest.  Bolivia’s cocaleros were caught up in this cycle 
for much of the 1980s and 1990s.  When local politicians realized the impact of the coca 
trade, cocaleros had opportunities to forge alliances and work toward a scale shift. 
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F. GOVERNMENT COUNTER-FRAMING AND COMMITMENT TO 
ERADICATION INHIBITS COCALEROS DURING THE BANZER 
REGIME 
Plan Dignidad, or Dignity Plan, was Bolivia’s most ambitious attempt to 
eradicate coca and defeat the cocalero movement.  At the end of Goni’s first term in 
office, former Bolivian military general and dictator Hugo Banzer won the presidential 
election in 1997 as part of a broad based political coalition.  His election represents a 
sweeping shift from avoiding confrontation with cocaleros to a no-holds-barred approach 
to coca crop reduction.  The U.S. government was becoming increasingly wary of 
Bolivia’s commitment to reduce the supply of coca and Banzer was expected to change 
that.  U.S. drug czar Barry McCaffrey warned Banzer that Bolivia had received $500 
million in U.S. aid while coca output increased, a situation that was no longer 
acceptable.123  There was initial dialogue between cocaleros and the Banzer government 
in 1997 and both parties reached an agreement to eradicate a total of 3000 coca hectares 
in exchange for compensation of US$2500 per ha., the opening of coca markets, and 
withdrawal of armed forces from the Chapare, among other demands.124 The duration of 
the agreement only lasted two months as Banzer succumbed to U.S. pressure by 
announcing his Plan in 1998.  The move was an unprecedented attack on coca at every 
level, but it especially focused on eradicating all coca deemed illegal by Law 1008.  
Compensation plans were phased out—meaning coca growers could no longer use the 
money to replant coca.  Banzer claimed that coca eradication would be “voluntary when 
possible, but forcible when necessary.”125 The plan laid out four pillars of action that the 
international community was expected to support: Alternative Development, Prevention 
and Rehabilitation, Eradication of Illegal and Excess Coca, and Interdiction.  In reality, 
the only pillar fully supported was coca eradication.126   
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Instead of depending on UMOPAR to carry out the eradication, Banzer created an 
entirely new Joint Task Force composed of military and police eradication teams.  During 
the heyday of Plan Dignidad, there were approximately 4,500 security force members 
permanently stationed in the Chapare.127  Cocaleros did not stand idly by.  In October 
2000, six coca grower federations came to an agreement with Banzer’s government that 
no new bases would be created in the Chapare.  Yet construction continued through 2001 
with 18 combined forces camps.128 
The ability of Banzer to implement his Plan Dignidad relied heavily on framing 
the Cocaleros as “narcotraffickers,” implicit conspirators in the coca-cocaine production 
chain.  The cocaleros became unwittingly linked to the drug traffickers in domestic and 
international discourse, providing a difficult obstacle to overcome—one that they would 
not achieve in the 1990s.  Banzer’s Plan was touted as the model for a successful anti-
drug policy, as coca cultivation was reduced to 6000 hectares.129 
The cocaleros were unable to successfully counter-frame in the 1990s, but they 
did frame the entrance of military forces in the Chapare as another example of U.S. 
intervention inside a sovereign nation.  The connection to the U.S. was easy to see: the 
U.S. was funding and training the military in police tactics while withholding alternative 
development funding until progress was made in eradication.130   
G. CONCLUSION 
Bolivia’s cocaleros in the 1980s and 1990s scale shifted the level of their 
movement from regional ones based in the Yungas and Chapare to a nationally 
recognized organization through successful framing as indigenous and peasants.  
Through political alliances with the peasant and worker unions, cocaleros were able to 
mobilize their supporters to establish road blocks and other nonviolent tactics in response 
to government eradication policies under relatively open political associational space.  
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International pressures vis à vis U.S. policy would both serve as a rallying point and a 
source of grievances for the cocaleros through the 1980s and 1990s.  The certification 
process meant that weaker countries like Bolivia had few options for growing their 
economies if they did not demonstrate compliance with U.S. anti-drug policies.  
Cocaleros were able to overcome many of these obstacles through opportunistic framing 
of their own, and the use of nonviolent tactics during protests.   
In the 1990s, Goni’s policies that recognized cocaleros as valid interlocutors 
provided a domestic political opportunity to possibly achieve a scale shift, but even Goni 
resorted to repressive measures and forced eradication in the end.  When former General 
Hugo Banzer came to power, he all but declared war on cocaleros, essentially closing off 
political associational space.  His framing of cocaleros as drug traffickers also inhibited 
the movement’s growth into the late 1990s.  Still, the cocaleros of Bolivia came out of the 
1980s and 1990s much stronger than their Peruvian counterparts. Despite repression, the 
movement maintained the freedom to organize in unions, and the protests continued.   
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IV. RISE OF THE MAS AND PERU’S “BOLIVIANIZATION” 
THAT NEVER HAPPENED 
Prior chapters gave explanations for why Peru’s cocaleros were unable to scale 
shift their movement past the regional level while Bolivia’s cocaleros were able to form a 
national coalition in the 1980s and 1990s. The analysis now centers on comparing Peru’s 
cocalero movement with Bolivia’s cocaleros since the rise of the MAS party in Bolivia 
(2002–present) coinciding with Toledo’s government (2001–2006), Garcia’s second 
government (2006–2011) and the Humala administration (2011–present).  Bolivia’s 
cocaleros, united under their left-of-center leader Evo Morales (President of Bolivia from 
2006–present) and fresh off consecutive electoral wins in municipal elections, continued 
their rise under the MAS party.  The movement not only achieved the seemingly 
impossible task of electing one of its own to the highest office in the land, but it also 
scale shifted the level of its movement to a place of national influence over all processes 
of the democracy.  According to Frank Xavier Barrios Suvelza,  
Evismo would stand out from earlier left-wing experiences precisely 
because it endows those social movements with ‘access to levels of state 
decision making’—a process of change that vice president Álvaro García 
Linera sees as a being of global resonance.131  
In this period, opportunities for organization, mobilization, and political alliances 
became more abundant for cocaleros due to an opening of what Yashar refers to as 
“political associational space.”132 Specifically, escalated levels of popular protest against 
forced eradication coincided with the restoration of decentralization measures that were 
taken away under Fujimori.  A number of mass cocalero marches on Lima seemed to 
signal a scale shift for the Peruvian movement.  Popular protests were more common and 
the government suppressed them less often.  Coca growing areas were steadily 
demilitarized and some dialogue occurred between cocaleros and government officials.  
While some of these opportunities arose outside cocalero control, nonviolent collective 
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action was rewarded with promises from the government.  Some have even pointed to the 
“Bolivianization” of Peru’s cocalero movement, as they attempted to replicate some of 
what they perceived to be the successful mechanisms for organization and mobilization in 
Bolivia.133 Nonetheless, a national Peruvian cocalero movement failed to coalesce.  
This chapter explores the unprecedented levels of mobilization of Peru’s 
cocaleros and demonstrates that not only are political alliances necessary to scale shift the 
level of a cocalero movement, but the correct alliances are essential.  Again, successful 
framing is an essential tool to secure such political alliances.  When the government was 
able to continually frame Peruvian cocalero leaders as part of The Shining Path, cocaleros 
could not unite or form alliances with a broader sector of society.  International pressure 
vis à vis the United States and domestic pressures of coca eradication also proves to be a 
consistent theme for mobilizing of cocaleros in both countries, but in the post-Fujimori 
era, the cocaleros of Peru became stagnant because of internal divisions.  This occurred in 
stark contrast to Bolivia’s cocaleros, whose base in the Chapare operated more like a 
union and imposed strict penalties on anyone not willing to fully support its goals.   
Additionally, this chapter analyzes the more recent decentralization laws in Peru 
and examines their effect on cocalero organization in Peru.  Since Fujimori had 
effectively closed off municipal governments to popular participation, cocaleros had even 
less access to their government up until President Alejandro Toledo restored a 
decentralized system.  However, unlike with the Law of Popular Participation in Bolivia, 
cocaleros in Peru had to vie with other social movements for control of the 
municipalities, and ultimately could not consolidate control.  Finally, with the left-of-
center MAS party quickly rising to power in Bolivia over a disenchantment with market 
oriented policies, this chapter argues that a Left turn does not necessarily enable a 
cocalero movement’s scale shift but may be an important factor. 
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A. THE RISE OF THE MAS PARTY 
By understanding the origin of the MAS Party in Bolivia, we see how important it 
is for the leader of a social movement to use frames, but also to have an inclusive 
approach that fosters political alliances that in turn bolsters the strength and influence of 
the movement.  Prior to Evo Morales’ election in 2005, cocaleros were a social 
movement to be reckoned with at the national level, yet few international actors shared 
their grievances.  It took until 2013 to secure a political victory on the international level, 
as much of Latin America and the world supported Bolivia’s petition to remove coca 
from the list of prohibited substances on the 1961 U.N. Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs.134  Such a victory was not won outright, but through a long process of building a 
political party, making the correct alliances, and framing their struggle in a way that was 
both credible and reinforced alliances. 
The predecessor party to the MAS, the Asemblea Soberanía de los Pueblos (ASP) 
won a mere three percent of the national vote in 1997.135  However, over the course of 
the Banzer, Quiroga, and Mesa presidencies, the MAS rose to prominence as the 
cocaleros protested forced eradication policies and repressive state action.  The 
characteristic missing from the cocalero approach early on was incorporation of the 
dissatisfied and antiestablishment urban mestizo.136  First, the continued attempts of 
Hugo Banzer and his successor, Jorge Quiroga, to eradicate coca fields fueled further 
support for Evo Morales and the MAS party.  Violent conflicts between coca growers and 
government eradication forces were common in Bolivia between 2000 and 2002.  Coca 
growth in the Chapare region dwindled due to successful eradication operations while 
production increased in the traditional growing area of the Yungas.  Even though that 
area was supposed to be off-limits to eradication forces, international pressure from the 
United States prompted the incursion of Banzer’s Joint Task Force (JTF) into the region.  
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The move turned out to be a serious mistake for the Banzer regime as his forces met 
violent resistance from coca growers, and public support for Plan Dignidad diminished.  
Following this shift, the Chapare coca growers again turned to mass marches and road 
blocks as forms of protest.  With public opinion trending their way, the cocaleros in the 
Yungas used collective action to force the withdrawal of eradication forces from their 
area.137   
The tactics that were most useful to cocaleros in the 1980s and 1990s emerged 
again in the post-Banzer era, demonstrating that the movement had learned from their 
experiences.  Yet mobilizing cocaleros in protest against eradication policies had little 
lasting effect on governments.  It became clear that to secure their interests against 
foreign and domestic pressures, cocaleros had to win elections at the national level.  Road 
blockages again turned out to be the most effective tactic at garnering national attention, 
but one particularly violent conflict in 2002 had the greatest effect for the rise of the 
MAS party in electoral politics.  In January of 2002, the Quiroga government renewed 
the push toward the goal of “zero coca” with an uncompromising approach.  Perhaps 
most importantly for mobilizing allies sympathetic to the coca growers’ cause, the 
government began to enforce its Supreme Decree 26415, which not only targeted illicit 
coca in the Chapare but also coca grown for previously legal markets.138  In response, 
several thousand Chapare coca growers clashed with security forces in the central coca 
market of Sacaba leading to the death of four security officers.  At this point, public 
opinion turned against coca growers, and further negotiations seemed impossible.  More 
than 80 coca union leaders were detained and a majority of the lower house of Congress 
voted to remove Evo Morales from his congressional seat.  Morales was accused of 
inciting the violence that led to the death of two policemen.  According to Katheryn 
Ledebur, this move backfired, as the deliberate targeting of Morales only bolstered his 
support and public image.139 In the last days of the Banzer regime in Bolivia and 
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throughout the presidency of Quiroga, it became clear that the government was more 
willing to enter talks with cocaleros, even if their promises were ultimately fruitless.  This 
meant a domestic opportunity for cocaleros to organize and build alliances.   
1. A Pragmatic and Inclusive Approach Helps the MAS Build Alliances 
The MAS party began building upon its cocalero base by appealing to the ethnic 
identities.  Unlike traditional parties, the MAS candidates were mostly indigenous.  This 
broadened their appeal to the majority indigenous population in Bolivia.  Perhaps more 
importantly, the MAS embraced the indigenous platform of land reform, autonomy, and 
recognition of the local indigenous justice systems.  The MAS fully embraced the 
indigenous frame by wearing the clothing, speaking in indigenous languages, and using 
traditional symbols (including coca) in the campaign.140 The candidates and the platform 
managed to appear genuinely indigenous as the MAS claimed to be the sole legitimate 
representative of indigenous people in Bolivia.  
It was not long before the U.S. interests in Bolivia were more evident in the 
electoral scene.  Evo Morales’s expulsion from Congress put him and his message of 
indigenous inclusion at the forefront of politics.  This seemingly unfortunate event did 
more for the cocalero movement than anyone expected.  Adding to the hype surround 
Morales, the U.S. Ambassador, Manuel Rocha, warned Bolivians four days before the 
2002 national election that U.S. aid would end if Morales were elected.141  The MAS 
party lost the presidential election in June 2002 by only 1.5 percent to Sánchez de 
Lozada.  However, it fared better than the incumbent’s party, the Acción Democrática 
Nacional (ADN), which took a mere 3.4 percent of the total vote.142 Despite its success, 
the MAS failed to capture a broader sector of society outside of its core supporters.  The 
failure to use a more inclusive approach left Bolivia susceptible to foreign influence.  The 
election of Sanchez de Lozada with his precarious coalition between the MNR and Paz 
Zamora’s Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) party was described as a 
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“shotgun wedding crafted mainly by US ambassador Manuel Rocha.”143  Evo Morales 
had neglected to reach across the aisle to ally with any of the other political parties and it 
likely cost him the election.  Additionally, he had not yet attempted to include larger 
sectors of civil society like the whites and mestizos in his party.144 The next election 
proved to be very different, as the MAS quickly adopted a more pragmatic approach that 
led to a majority of popular votes for the presidency.   
Following its narrow defeat in the 2002 election, the MAS party began an internal 
transformation.  While Morales’s rival (Felipe Quispe) was denouncing whites and 
mestizos, the MAS party was reaching out to them.  The MAS allied with a mestizo-
dominated party, the Movimiento Sin Miedo, which was led by the mayor of La Paz.  
Additionally, the MAS expanded its platform to include a broad-based platform of 
grievances shared by the urban whites and mestizos.145   
B. PERU’S ATTEMPTS AT BOLIVIANIZATION 
Peru’s cocalero efforts at modeling their movement like the nationally powerful 
one in Bolivia began with the end of the Fujimori regime and the opening up of political 
associational space.  The administration of President Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006) was 
firmly against the idea of allowing free coca production.  As he sought to repair the 
damages done to government institutions throughout the Fujimori era, he rarely took 
notice of cocaleros until they gained national attention through their repertoire of protest.  
The Toledo doctrine emphasized alternative development over eradication of the coca 
plant, even though he continued to pursue eradication goals as the proposals for new 
solutions were being discussed.  At first, the cocaleros sought dialogue with Toledo’s 
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government to resolve their differences. When talks in October 2001 and March 2002 
failed to produce any results, the cocaleros from the UHV called for mass protest.146 
1. Peru’s Cocaleros Appear United Nationally 
When negotiations with the government were completely stalled, the cocaleros 
appeared more united than ever before.  With the government continuing to pursue 
eradication efforts, the cocaleros from the Monzón Valley marched on Lima in June 
2002, followed by mass protests in the UHV and a show of solidarity from the coca 
growers in the VRAE.  The support from the VRAE is important to note because no 
eradication efforts were ongoing there at the time.  Because the collective action was 
national and succeeded at gaining the attention of the Toledo government it appears that 
the cocalero movement achieved a scale shift to the national level, but this action was 
simply a façade that masked the true weakness of the movement.  Peru’s cocaleros soon 
demonstrated their inability to overcome internal divisions, even though opportunities for 
mobilization were greater than ever before.  Additionally, their attempts to borrow frames 
of protest from Bolivia proved futile because of a credibility problem.147    
a. Frames of Protest: Radical and Pragmatic Approaches 
Sidney Tarrow found that a collective identity is a critically important 
factor for the creation of a social movement.148  As shown in the previous chapter, the 
way Bolivia’s cocaleros framed their mixed identity ranged from indigenous to peasants, 
and later as nationalists.  In Peru, this framing of mixed identities was complicated by 
very diverse economic, social, and ethnic backgrounds.149 Attempting to replicate the 
success of Bolivia’s cocaleros in framing their movement as an indigenous one, the 
cocaleros of Peru seized upon the domestic opportunity with the demise of the Fujimori 
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regime and sought to unite their regional members.  In Bolivia, the work of elevating 
indigenous discourse to a prominent position in Bolivian politics had been accomplished 
for cocaleros because of the “first-generation” Katarista movement.150 A majority 
indigenous population with deeply rooted traditions of chewing coca leaves easily 
internalized the indigenous frame and built upon the common identity.  In contrast, 
Peru’s indigenous movements were weak and regional by comparison, except for the 
Southern department of Puno.151  Beginning in 2002, coca leaders in Peru began to 
appropriate some of the language used by the Bolivian cocaleros after they met with Evo 
Morales, the current MAS party leader.  As a slogan, they adopted “Coca o Muerte. 
Venceremos” meaning, “Coca or Death.  We Shall Prevail.”152 This declaration indicated 
a radical approach, compared to a more pragmatic approach that merely sought dialogue 
with the government.  At the same time, cocalero leaders spoke of the hoja sagrada 
(sacred leaf) as a symbol of Peruvian identity.  In Bolivia, the idea of the coca leaf as a 
sacred part of their indigenous history was widely accepted among society, though some 
remained disapproving of its other uses.  But in Peru, coca leaf chewing was looked 
down upon by the majority of society.153  This difference meant that radical frames 
would not help Peru’s cocaleros in building alliances. 
These first attempts at forming a national unity around an indigenous 
tradition of coca in Peru proved unsuccessful.  First of all, the frames were overtly 
militant, signaling to policymakers and citizens alike that cocalero demands might result 
in the type of violence associated with Sendero Luminoso.  Second, cocaleros outside of 
the VRAE, especially in the UHV, favored a more pragmatic frame that focused on 
peacefully engaging the government over its eradication policies. Further complicating 
the construction of a shared identity, the leaders of the coca growing regions lacked 
credibility themselves.   
                                                 
150 Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: the Rise of Indigenous Movements and the 
Postliberal Challenge, 152–223. 
151 Ibid., 267. 
152 Van Dun, Cocaleros: Violence, Drugs and Social Mobilization in the Post-Conflict Upper 
Huallaga Valley, Peru, 215. 
153 Ibid., 217. 
 57 
b. Coca Leaders’ Credibility Problems 
The first nationally-recognized coca leader that emerged to unite the 
various coca growing regions in Peru had a credibility problem, unlike Evo Morales.  
Nelson Palomino came from a cocalero family in the VRAE, but was not a cocalero 
himself.  Nevertheless, he was elected the National Confederation of Agricultural 
Producers of Peruvian Coca Regions (CONPACCP) first national leader.   Palomino 
nonetheless emulated Morales by portraying the coca leaf as an important part of 
Peruvian collective identity.  He regularly spoke of the hoja sagrada (sacred leaf) and 
represented himself as an indigenous person by wearing traditional garb and carrying 
around the Inca flag.  Most importantly to the government, however, he used this 
discourse to promote the idea that all cultivation of coca was legitimate, whether destined 
for legal markets or not.154 His language came to symbolize the radical approach.  The 
Toledo government and the Peruvian people were wary of losing control over the VRAE 
to what they perceived might be a resurgent part of the Shining Path.  As his reputation 
increased nationally among the coca growing regions, the government began to view him 
as an enemy of the state.  He was arrested in February 2003 and charged with “support 
for terrorism, disturbance of the electoral process, the kidnapping of journalists, 
extortion, grand theft, domestic violence, and creating public disturbances.”155  All of his 
charges were nationally televised and the link between Palomino and terrorism was 
firmly established in the minds of Peruvians.  The terrorism charge was later dropped 
because the category was used as a blanket charge to restrict basic civil rights under the 
Fujimori regime.156   
2. Absence of Sympathizers 
Two women from the UHV succeeded Palomino as leader of the 
CONPACCP: Nancy Obregón and Elsa Malpartida.  Together, they brought a more 
pragmatic approach to protest and framing of the national movement.  In addition to 
                                                 
154 Ibid., 210–211. 
155 Ibid., 211. 
156 Ibid. 
 58 
ending violent protests in Huamanga, where Palomino was imprisoned, Obregón and 
Malpartida organized a mass cocalero march on Lima in 2003.157  Cocaleros had 
participated in some mass demonstrations that received attention from the national 
government before, but none quite as large as the 2003 Marcha de Sacrificio.  Borrowing 
a tactic from Peruvian campesinos and miners, the cocaleros used a peaceful three-week 
march through the Andes to the capitol of Lima.  The protests drew much attention from 
the media, and cocaleros were able to demonstrate their new frames of protest with 
slogans like:  
‘De pie, marchar y el pueblo va a triunfar’, (‘Walk ever onward on the 
path to victory’), ‘No somos terroristas, somos campesinos’, (‘We aren’t 
terrorists, we are campesinos’), ‘El Pueblo unido jamas sera vencido’ (‘A 
people that stands united can never be vanquished’) and of course the 
CONPACCP’s slogan ‘Coca o Muerte’ (Coca or Death).158  
The march resulted in Toledo first declaring that coca was a Peruvian 
tradition and then decreeing a number of concessions to coca growers.  Among the 
concessions were promises of a suspension of all other national laws that called for 
eradication of coca, a gradual reduction of coca overall, and a limit on CORAH’s 
activities that restricted them to only eradicate new fields not registered with ENACO. 159  
However, the government failed to implement the decree and the different cocalero 
organizations that participated in the march rejected the provisions of the decree and only 
served to divide them. Overall, cocaleros were able to unite across the countryside to 
march, but it was a march of only cocaleros.  There were no sympathizers or allies that 
joined them in their struggle.  In the end, the movement could not be sustained by 
cocalero activism alone.  Without allies, cocaleros were doomed to experience but a brief 
moment as a national level movement.160   
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C. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE AND THE WEAK STATE 
While Palomino was claiming the indigenous heritage of the coca leaf in Peru, 
coca prices for farmers reached an all-time high at nearly U.S. $5 per kilogram.161 
Cocaleros protested Palomino’s imprisonment, treating him as a symbol of their plight.  
Palomino himself suggested that Toledo had arrested him because his government was 
weak and unable to deal directly with the social movement.162 
Continuing to play their traditional game of carrot and stick, the United States 
again demonstrated its ability to influence the relationship between the state and 
cocaleros.  The United States was freshly aware of both the success of Banzer’s Plan 
Dignidad in Bolivia, as well as the history of cocaleros and terrorism in Peru.  Adding the 
context of the tragedy on 9/11, the United States was determined to deny any remaining 
terrorists a safe haven, and the means of accomplishing that task was through forced 
eradication of the coca fields.  The U.S. ambassador began to promote frames like “coca-
growing narcofarmers”163 to marginalize the cocalero movement and have them treated 
as criminals.  Because the Toledo government was weak and desperately needed 
international assistance it was especially susceptible to pressure from the United States.  
Thus, the government used counter-frames against their cocaleros, and domestic 
opportunities for mediation with the government remained mostly closed during the 
Toledo administration. When coupled with the radical frames used by cocaleros, this 
dynamic hindered cocaleros from making further alliances that might have enabled a 
scale shift during this period. 
D. INTERNAL DIVISIONS LEAD TO A PURSUIT OF ALLIANCES 
After the Marcha in 2003, internal divisions plagued the national cocalero 
movement in Peru.  The supreme decree issued by Toledo was the main cause of division 
among cocaleros.  Nancy Obregón and Elsa Malpartida signed an agreement that 
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included a gradual reduction of coca nationwide.  For the VRAE cocaleros, this was a 
mistake and a betrayal of the true cause.  Immediately, the CONPACCP became an 
organization with support only from the Upper Huallaga.  The VRAE cocaleros put their 
weight behind FEPAVRAE and continued to contest the national leadership of the 
CONPACCP.  With the loss of support from other cocaleros, the CONPACCP did what 
arguably should have been a goal all along: they sought alliances with a broader sector of 
Peruvian society.164 
Initially, the cocaleros found willing allies in workers organizations, campesino 
federations, intellectuals, and student organizations.  Many of these groups organized 
their own protests against the Toledo government and promised to join cocaleros in 
protest, but in reality, they never did.  One example concerns a Free Trade Agreement 
that the Toledo government made with the United States and was set to take effect in 
June 2005.  The cocaleros protested in the UHV, but the rest of the country remained 
silent.165   
Cocaleros next turned to sympathetic politicians for alliances.  Most of the willing 
politicians were from the radical political left.  Moreover, the politicians had a tendency 
to only support cocaleros around elections as a way of gaining national media attention.  
When the CONPACCP allowed some of the more radical political parties to participate in 
their national congress, it restricted the pragmatic discourse that Obregón was originally 
determined to maintain.  When the “Coca o Muerte” slogan returned to the organization, 
it conversely kept other less radical organizations from making alliances with the 
cocaleros.  Thus, the main political party to support Peru’s cocaleros became Ollanta 
Humala’s Partido Nacionalista Peruano (PNP).  Yet this alliance was very different from 
the way Bolivia’s cocaleros had formed their own party amid a collapse of the traditional 
party system.166  
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E. ANOTHER LOOK AT DECENTRALIZATION EFFORTS 
Peru’s efforts at decentralization present an interesting puzzle.  On one hand, 
decentralization brought about an increase in political opportunities for cocaleros, at least 
for them to compete in municipal elections.  Fujimori had recentralized control after the 
autogolpe in 1992, but his successor Toledo by restarting the decentralization that had 
created 13 regional governments in 1989.167 Whether Toledo was attempting to pacify a 
slew of social movements, create opportunities for his own party to win local elections, or 
simply to further democracy is still a matter that scholar disagree on. However, most 
scholars still point to disenchantment with neoliberal policies as the main cause of social 
mobilization in Peru in the 2000s.168 The most referred-to event that exemplifies this 
discontent is the protest that occurred in Arequipa in June 2002.  In this case, citizens and 
local governments objected to the sale of state-owned electric companies and their 
popular uprising contributed to the weakening of the newly installed regime of Toledo.169  
Cocaleros, however, did not lead protests against neoliberalism nor did they make 
alliances with the other actors in these protests because at the time they were still intent 
on using the radical discourse of leaders like Palomino.  The decentralization measures 
that Toledo put in place expanded the domestic opportunities for cocaleros, but also led 
to their own regionalization.  With cocaleros spread from the UHV to the VRAE among 
other lesser areas, the concentration of support did not happen as it did in the Chapare of 
Bolivia.  Cocalero leader Nelson Palomino even went as far as forcing the local 
population of the VRAE to boycott regional elections.170 Eventually, cocaleros in the 
VRAE saw the most success in municipal level elections, but in the rest of Peru, other 
social movements were vying for their own spot.  Indeed, the unionized structure of the 
cocaleros in Bolivia likely gave them a decisive advantage in selecting candidates and 
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competing with other groups when compared to the cocaleros of Peru.171 Remarkably, 
other organized social movements such as the miners, peasants confederations, and the 
Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana (Interethnic Association for the  
Development of the Peruvian Amazon—AIDESEP) all reached out to their counterparts 
in Bolivia and Ecuador while the cocaleros appeared internally divisive and isolated from 
other movements.172 
F. COMPARING THE LEFT-TURN 
In Bolivia, the rise of the MAS coincided with a strong turn to the political left.  
Many scholars argue that “disenchantment with market-oriented policies and the parties 
that implemented them”173 is one of the main factors contributing to the rise of the Left 
in Bolivia and throughout Latin America.  Whether or not a Left turn contributes to the 
rise of cocaleros is the subject of this section.  With their roots in labor based 
organizations like the COB and CSUTCB, Bolivia’s cocaleros have always favored 
alliances with Leftist groups.  However, cocaleros could rarely leverage left-of-center 
political parties for much of their movements’ history, simply because both countries 
shifted significantly to the political right with the start of neoliberal reforms in the 1980s.   
In Bolivia, a decline in support for the traditional parties (such as the MNR) 
coupled with a growing negative perception of neoliberalism presented an opportunity for 
a new party to capture votes. Cocaleros participated in two major protests that 
exemplified this growing disenchantment.  The Water War of 2000 and the Gas Wars of 
2003 ultimately led to the downfall of Sanchez de Lozada and further solidified the 
nationalist and antiestablishment sentiments among the general population, but especially 
among the majority indigenous voters.  Evo Morales and the MAS were able to channel 
these feelings into support for the MAS platform, which was the most inclusive 
indigenous based party in the 2005 elections.  The MAS not only won support from those 
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who self-identified as indigenous during this left turn, but the shift enabled them to 
capture the traditional populist voters—the urban whites and mestizos who shared a left-
of-center orientation. Because of Bolivia’s traditional party collapse amid a growing 
disenchantment with government economic policies, cocaleros were able to secure 
alliances that previously shared few overlapping goals or grievances.  Additionally, 
Bolivia’s relatively peaceful internal dynamics (no insurgency or civil war) since 
democratization in 1982 meant that the political left was not immediately associated with 
radical Maoist or terrorist groups, as was the case in Peru. 
Peru’s government remained right-of-center through the administration of Toledo 
(2001-2006) and ironically the same through the second administration of Alan Garcia 
(2006-2011).  The reason for Peru’s late turn to the left in 2011with the election of 
Humala coincides with the hypothesis of why cocaleros could not build their base and 
organization.  As discussed before, the cocaleros of Peru had little opportunity to 
organize or mobilize due to the internal conflict between the state and Sendero Luminoso.  
According to leading scholars, “the social forces that sustained Peru’s electoral Left were 
thrown into disarray in the 1990s, and the Left, fractured and demoralized, was unable to 
rebuild its social base and party organization.”174 How Garcia later returned to the 
political arena as a right of center candidate with the APRA party is beyond the scope of 
this thesis.  The evidence that Peru’s cocaleros remained divided and regional throughout 
the administrations of Toledo and Garcia points to a single correlation—cocaleros did not 
scale shift past the regional level in the absence of a political Left turn in their country.  
Therefore, a more useful comparison is between Peru and Bolivia after they both 
eventually elected left-of-center candidates to the presidency. 
Ollanta Humala has symbolized a shift to the Left in Peru primarily through his 
ardent nationalism and opposition to foreign companies that are responsible for the 
exploitation of Peru’s natural resources, much like Evo Morales did in Bolivia.  Also like 
Morales, Humala promised cocaleros an end to forced eradication efforts and a distancing 
                                                 
174 Steven Levitsky and Kenneth M Roberts, “Introduction,” in The Resurgence of the Latin American 
Left (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2011), 394–395. 
 64 
of relations with the United States.175 Additionally, he planned to focus on state-led 
internal development that would lead to a redistribution of wealth.  While Humala was 
decidedly anti-establishment, the market reforms in Peru were more successful than in 
most of Latin America.  Therefore, there is a large difference between Bolivia and Peru; 
the former became completely disenchanted with market policies, while the latter thought 
favorably of them.  How then can Humala’s election in 2011 be explained?  According to 
Madrid, Humala’s election can be seen as a growing desire to address a large number of 
inequalities that exist between Peru’s coastal areas and the highlands and Amazon.176 
It was not long before Humala declared an end to forced eradication and then 
promptly reversed his decision—a result of consistent pressure from the United States to 
maintain such policies.  While his presidency marks a turning point for Peru, it has not 
meant the reprieve for cocaleros that was achieved in Bolivia under Morales.  In the 
words of the Ucayali chamber of commerce president, “It’s the same policy as the 
previous government…You have to have to go on strike or create stoppages just to sit 
down and talk.”177   
G. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explained the rise of Bolivia’s cocaleros as a combination of 
several factors.  First, cocaleros enjoyed political associational space while still subject to 
pressure from the United States.  Though the administrations of Banzer, Quiroga, and 
Goni all continued forced eradication in some form, cocaleros were able to scale shift the 
level of their movement through collective action that was mostly unimpeded by the 
state.  Second, Bolivia’s cocaleros made political alliances with the urban whites and 
mestizos that contributed to the electoral success of the MAS in the 2005 presidential 
election.  Additionally, cocalero participation in the Water War of 2000 and the Gas Wars 
in 2003 demonstrated that alliances work both ways.  Third, collaboration with other 
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social movements contributed to a united political party under an indigenous leader and 
coca grower himself, Evo Morales.   
In contrast to the Bolivian cocaleros, Peru’s regional cocalero movements could 
not unite under a single leader or a political party.  Internal divisions and alliances with 
leftist political parties discredited their movement.  Though decentralization measures 
were restored under Toledo, Peru’s cocaleros could not take advantage of them to scale 
shift their movement because they had to compete with other social movements.  Even 
though political associational space created an opportunity for the “Bolivianization” of 
Peru’s cocalero movement, the inability to coalesce into a political party or make 
alliances with other movements severely limited their influence.  
Finally, this chapter has ruled out the hypothesis that a turn to the political Left is 
a factor for cocalero mobilization.  The MAS party provided an anti-establishment 
alternative to the traditional parties—a niche that proved to be popular as Bolivians 
(especially the majority indigenous ones) became disenchanted with the effects of 
neoliberal reforms.  Since Morales and the MAS party came to power in 2006, they have 
championed alternative development programs over forced eradication, while seeking to 
reduce the amount of coca that is potentially diverted for the cocaine trade.178 The 
cocaleros eventually gained direct access to the highest levels of government decision-
making through the election of Morales, but Peru’s cocaleros did not fare so well under 
their left turn.  When Peru elected Humala in 2011, they too were upset with the level of 
foreign influence over their country, especially involving the exploitation of their natural 
resources.  But when it came to the issue of coca, Humala’s promises proved void like his 
predecessors. 
 
                                                 
178 Linda Farthing and Benjamin Kohl, “Social Control: Bolivia’s New Approach to Coca Reduction,” 
Latin American Perspectives 37, no. 4 (2010): 197–213. 
 66 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 67 
V. CONCLUSION  
The previous chapters show that cocalero movements in Peru and Bolivia took 
different trajectories under their new democracies.  The internal dynamics of the cocalero 
movements at times used similar frames and tactics, but success in achieving a scale shift 
did not rest on replication alone.  Other structural factors affected the ability of cocaleros 
to mobilize and forge alliances.  Such factors within the scope of this thesis include 
international pressure, constraints on political associational space, and decentralization 
measures.  The analysis shows that these highly polarizing social movements do not 
always determine their own fate.   
A. THE “SCORES” 
This thesis analyzed the importance of factors at the international, national, and 
subnational level.  For the international level, my “score” was determined by the presence 
of foreign pressure that threatened the political or economic status of cocaleros, and 
whether or not the cocalero movement used the presence of such pressure to claim unjust 
intervention in national affairs.  At the national level the score was determined by how 
different executives either allowed for political associational space or kept it closed.  
Finally, the subnational level looked at factors that allowed cocaleros to take advantage 
of decentralization measures. The decentralization measures, when enacted, provided 
greater resources and positions of authority at the municipal level.  Specifically, political 
associational space, the presence of a dominant organizational structure in a specific 
geographic area, and internal movement dynamics were factors that show a clear 
difference between the two cocalero movements. Certainly there are additional factors 
that this thesis did not account for at each level.  However, these factors appear to be the 
most salient for cocaleros and social movements in general. 
The overall research question I posed was: What explains the variation in cocalero 
mobilization between Peru and Bolivia?  Using the idea of the scale shift, I sought to 
understand factors that either inhibited or helped cocalero movements build broad-based 
political alliances.  The first question I had to ask after the major research question was: 
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Why do cocaleros mobilize?  Goldstone and Tilly show that there are two overarching 
paths that drive social mobilization in general: threat and political opportunity.179  Most 
of the literature on cocaleros focuses on the effects of U.S. policy and determine that the 
threat of forced eradication is the primary causal factor in cocalero mobilization.   As this 
thesis has shown, however, cocaleros from different regions also mobilize under open 
political associational space.  Additionally, coca growers not targeted by government 
eradication forces may mobilize to show solidarity with the greater movement.  This 
thesis finds that political opportunity plays a greater role in setting the conditions needed 
to achieve a scale shift than any other factor.  In my analysis, this is a national level 
factor.  Yashar defines political associational space as “the de facto existence of freedom 
of association and expression.  It is not reducible to regime type; it is not equal to 
democracy.”180 Others define the same concept as “the probability that social protest 
actions will lead to success in achieving a desired outcome.”181  This analysis of the 
cocalero movements in Peru and Bolivia has shown that under conditions of democracy, 
there can be closed associational space as in the case of Hugo Banzer.  His unwillingness 
to negotiate with cocaleros hindered the cocalero movement in Bolivia, but only 
temporarily.  Upon his early exit from office, cocaleros took advantage of the more 
inclusive approaches taken by successive administrations.  In the case of Peru, a more 
serious example of closed associational space existed in the 1980s as cocaleros were 
prohibited from forming their own organization at the hand of Sendero Luminoso.  In the 
1990s, President Fujimori again closed off associational space and re-centralized the 
government as he fought and successfully concluded Peru’s civil war.  Near the end of 
his administration and into the Toledo years and beyond, cocaleros had greater 
opportunities, but internal movement dynamics prevented a scale shift.   
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B. THE CHOICE BETWEEN RADICAL AND PRAGMATIC FRAMES 
Now looking at the internal dynamics of cocalero movements in Peru and Bolivia 
and their ability to scale shift the level of their movement, there are striking differences 
that explain why Bolivia’s groups succeeded in forming a broad based inclusive political 
party and Peru’s cocaleros struggled to form a national movement even when 
associational space existed.  Through examination across time, cocalero movements in 
both countries rose or fell on their ability to make political alliances. Within a movement, 
there was a choice to use either radical or pragmatic frames.  The use of the indigenous 
frames does not have a clear correlation with one or the other.  In Bolivia’s case, 
cocaleros built upon past success from the Katarista indigenous movement, claiming the 
right to grow coca as part of their indigenous heritage.  When Peru’s cocaleros tried to 
imitate Bolivia in the 2000s, the frames were seen as radical and associated with Sendero 
Luminoso.  Though cocaleros in the 1980s formed alliances with Sendero out of 
economic necessity and occasionally the two groups coexist in the VRAE, the linkage has 
been more fanciful than concrete.  Cocalero leaders in Peru eventually learned the futility 
of using the radical frames and took a more pragmatic approach, instead focusing on 
integration and alternative development goals.182  The tactics did not have to change with 
a pragmatic approach; nonviolent protest and general strikes were still very much a part 
of cocaleros’ repertoire.  Cocaleros using pragmatic frames has not achieved 
Bolivianization in Peru.  While social movement theory suggests the chances of a scale 
shift are greater, Peru’s cocaleros remain buoyed by other factors, especially their internal 
divisions and inability to attract a broader sector of society. 
While cocalero movements like the Peruvian one can increase the likelihood of 
attracting outside support for their movement through pragmatic framing, the opportunity 
structures must first be present.  Both are necessary conditions to reach higher levels, but 
neither condition is sufficient for a scale shift.  Even under open associational space, 
radical framing within the movement can inhibit the movement’s expansion.   
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C. THE WAY FORWARD FOR BOLIVIA’S MOVEMENT: IS 
ATTRACTING BROADER SUPPORT POSSIBLE? 
Since being elected president of Bolivia, Evo Morales introduced his social 
control approach to drugs, “coca yes, cocaine no.”183  While this approach appeased his 
cocalero base, Morales has had a tougher time in international relations, especially with 
the United States.  Morales expelled the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency in 2009, then 
USAID in 2013.184  At the same time, however, his administration touts a reduction in 
overall coca cultivation levels through voluntary measures.185  Morales’s 2013 victory for 
coca growers in the United Nations shows that on the international level, he can use 
multilateral institutions to represent the interests of cocaleros.  However, the decision to 
recognize the indigenous right of coca chewing applies only to Bolivia.   
D. WILL PERU’S COCALERO MOVEMENT EVER REACH THE 
NATIONAL LEVEL? 
There is still doubt as to the credibility of coca growers in Peru who claim the 
same indigenous rights as Bolivia.  Though the Humala administration did not object to 
Bolivia’s exception, it has not pursued the same rights for its cocaleros.  Though many of 
the factors that contribute to cocalero mobilization exist, the internal dynamics of the 
Peruvian movement are likely the main factor holding them back from a scale shift.  
Combined with a slew of other social movements, all of them vying for attention, it is 
doubtful that Peru’s cocalero movement will ever scale shift to become a national 
influence centered on coca politics.   
E. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
This thesis has shown that government counter-framing can severely inhibit a 
cocalero movement from achieving a scale shift.  Framing coca growers as drug 
traffickers and terrorists may inhibit a national level movement, but eventually the frames 
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can be counter-productive as they limit a government’s options.  Many governments have 
a policy that prohibits them from negotiating with terrorists.  When cocaleros are framed 
as such, options that include negotiation are automatically discarded in favor of one 
option: repression.   
F. FRAMING AND ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT  
As seen in the cases of Bolivia and Peru, forced coca eradication was usually 
combined with some sort of alternative development effort.  Most of the time, however, 
these programs were half-hearted efforts or completely underfunded.  The economic 
feasibility of such programs is a discussion outside the scope of this thesis, but when a 
government counter-frames with radical labels like drug traffickers and terrorists, it 
becomes difficult to know whom to target for repression and whom to target for 
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